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Policy instruments to control Amazon fires: a simulation approach 
 
Abstract 
Agricultural fires are a double-edged sword that allow for cost-efficient land management in 
the tropics but also cause accidental fires and emissions of carbon and pollutants. To control 
fires in Amazon, it is currently unclear whether policy-makers should prioritize command-
and-control or incentive-based instruments such as REDD+. Aiming to generate knowledge 
about the relative merits of the two policy approaches, this paper presents a spatially-explicit 
agent-based model that simulates the causal effects of four policy instruments on intended 
and unintended fires. All instruments proved effective in overturning the predominance of 
highly profitable but risky fire-use and decreasing accidental fires, but none were free from 
imperfections. The performance of command-and-control proved highly sensitive to the 
spatial and social reach of enforcement. Side-effects of incentive-based instruments included 
a disproportionate increase in controlled fires and a reduced acceptance of conservation 
subsidies, caused by the prohibition of reckless fires, and also indirect deforestation. The 
instruments that were most effective in reducing deforestation were not the most effective in 
reducing fires and vice-versa, which suggests that the two goals cannot be achieved with a 
single policy intervention. 
 





Fire is one of the major socio-environmental challenges facing the humid tropics, including 
the Amazon Basin. On the one hand, fire is an efficient tool to prepare, weed and fertilize 
land, and it provides profit and subsistence to a wide range of farmers from smallholders to 
large cattle ranchers. On the other, it is a source of escaped fires and atmospheric pollutants, a 
potential cause of soil degradation and a threat to rainforests, biodiversity and farmers' assets 
and health (Nepstad et al. 2001 and 2007, Mendonça et al., 2004, Chen et al., 2011, Carmenta 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, the likelihood of disastrous wildfires this century is increased by 
predicted climate and vegetation changes linked to a higher frequency of extreme droughts, 
(Malhi et al., 2009, Chen et al. 2011, Coe et al, 2013, Davidson et al, 2012). For example, in 
1998 fires in the Brazilian Amazonian state of Roraima affected over 5 million hectares of 
forest (Cochrane, 2009, p.17), while 2015 was the hottest year in the amazon over the last 
century (Jiménez-Muñoz et al., 2016). 
Preventing an increase in the prevalence of fires in the Amazon and elsewhere requires 
policies that internalize externalities (Malhi et al., 2009, Sorrensen, 2009, Carmenta et al, 
2013). In Brazil, one of the federal government’s main responses to the fire problem is the 
controlled burn law, which replicates the ban-surveillance-sanction approach that proved 
highly successful for deforestation. Yet, to-date, there is no assessment of the impact of this 
policy on fires. Interventions are also occurring at local scales, including incentive-based 
initiatives of payment for avoided deforestation and avoided forest degradation (REDD+), as 
well as municipal actions supporting mechanized land preparation substituting for slash-and-
burn (Simões and Schmitz, 2000, Börner et al., 2007 and 2013, SEMA-AC, 2011).  
The evaluation of impacts and limitations of command-and-control and incentive-based 
approaches to policy requires reliable empirical evidence. However, empirical work cannot 
provide definite answers without being guided by refutable hypotheses. This paper seeks to 
contribute with such hypotheses by developing an analytical device that represents the 
Amazon fire system both in the absence and presence of intervention. This is achievable with 
an agent-based, spatially-explicit simulation model. Policies, such as agricultural subsidies or 
payment ecosystem services (PES), aim to influence decisions with supra-individual 
consequences made by heterogeneous individuals. Policy interventions inevitably trigger a 
chain of connected processes whose net impact on the key state variables is not easy to intuit 
from pure reasoning without the support of an analytical tool. It is in this particular sense that 
a simulation model is useful (Zhao et al, 2012).  
The use of spatially-explicit agent-based models for analyzing policies, especially their 
implications for land use change, is growing in the literature (Kremmydas, 2012, Zhao, 
2012). Examples include changes of the German and Italian agricultural subsidies (Happe et 
al, 2008 Lobianco, 2007) and incentives to adopt water-saving irrigation techniques (Berger, 
2001). The focus on agents allows incorporation of interactions between landscape processes 
and human decisions as well as heterogeneity among decision-makers. In an explicit 
modelled space, land parcels influence each other being thus subjected to spatial spill-overs 
that may be engendered by policy. 
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Two are the main reasons for adopting agent-based modelling. First, its bottom-up approach 
enables multiple possibilities of individual and collective reactions to policy, including those 
that would prevent desired outcomes from being achieved or would favor undesired results. 
Second, it generates results with a level of heterogeneity/variability which reasonably 
resembles the data available for policy evaluation. However, regarding this second reason, a 
clarification is needed. Part of the richness of the results is very hard to reduce to refutable 
hypotheses that may guide policy evaluation. As producing such hypotheses is one of our 
main goals, we opted for a causal inference approach to simulation analysis (Marshall and 
Galea, 2014). This means focussing on comparing policy outcome variables in baseline and 
policy scenarios, rather than exposing the plethora of patterns the variables describe across 
time and space. The model presented in this paper is a tool to build knowledge on the 
potential results of policy options to reduce Amazon fires. Due to the scarcity of knowledge 
on this topic, we opt to focus the modelling effort on detailing a few key components of the 
Amazon fire system, mainly farmer behavior and policy instruments, and incorporate other 
aspects in a rather stylized way. This approach strives to maximize the usefulness of the 
exercise for empirical work, because scant existing evidence (table 1) does not allow for 
testing of the intricate hypotheses that would be yielded by a more comprehensive model. 
There is a further methodological reason for adopting a simple (or stylized) model. A clear 
trade-off exists between realism (the number and detail of real-world natural and social 
processes represented) and identification of causal effects (the confidence that observed 
variations in outcome variables are strictly due to variations in policy). Simulation models are 
different from models with analytic (pen-and-paper) solutions in that they do not necessarily 
yield identification. Non-linearity and stochasticity, coupled with endogeneization of most 
variables, makes it hard to track the causes of the observed behavior of the main variables 
(Marshall and Galea, 2014). This difficulty grows with realism (El-Sayed et al., 2012, 
Cederman and Giradin, 2007, Townsley and Birks, 2008). We opt first of all for causal effect 
identification and pay the cost of reduced realism by greatly simplifying the Amazon fire 
system. The main benefits are the clarity and the empirical refutability of the hypotheses 
about the impacts of policy that can be derived from the results. 
The policy background is synthesized in the next section and the model is presented in 
section three. The results are analyzed and interpreted in section four, followed by a brief 
conclusion. 
Table 1 [here] 
2 Fire policy in Brazil 
2.1 Brief overview 
Policy interventions that affect Amazon fires include various initiatives that differ in terms of 
how directly they impact on fires, the level of government introducing the policy, the targeted 
social group and the type of policy instrument chosen. Here, we examine three key 
interventions. First, at the national level, the controlled burn law of 1998 regulates fire use by 
instituting licensing and monitoring (Brasil, 1998). It is a command-and-control instrument 
4 
 
against agricultural fires that have a high probability of turning into uncontrolled fires and 
causing major damage (Brasil, 1998, Steil, 2009). However, in practice, permit granting is 
marginal (Toniolo, 2008, p.193-194, Carmenta et al., 2013, Cammelli, 2014, p. 13, Costa, 
2004, p. 184), enforcement is rare (IBAMA-PA, 2015) and recent fieldwork
1
 indicated that 
few state and local governments execute these functions. The main barriers for the farmers 
are the transaction costs of obtaining the documents demanded by permit requisition, 
especially the proof of land ownership, travelling often long distances from farms to 
environmental offices in urban areas (Carmenta et al., 2013, Cammelli, 2014, p.48). 
Second, subsidies have been used to reduce fire and offer different routes for promoting the 
technological transition of smallholders to fire-free agriculture; mechanization and 
agroforestry. These include subsidies for mechanized land preparation offered by some 
municipal governments, generally together with extra financial support for agricultural inputs 
(Börner et al, 2007, Emater, 2015b, Simões and Schmitz, 2000). Alternatively, pilot projects 
are used to stimulate agroforestry systems, which combine trees, crops and animals in the 
same plot without resort to fire or inputs. The agroforestry pathway tends to be funded by 
NGOs and public institutions, and is advocated as “greener” and more sustainable than 
mechanization (Serra, 2005, Arco-verde, 2008, MMA, 2009). However, progress on these 
fronts tends to be inhibited by constraints facing the targeted farmers, including lack of 
access to capital and credit, labor, inputs and rural extension services. Two of these 
constraints are critical for the shift to agroforestry. First, labor, since agroforestry requires a 
higher working effort, at least initially (Arco-verde, 2008, p.93). Second, credit, as public and 
private banks still lack a standardized methodology to estimate the profitability of 
agroforestry systems with sufficient certainty (Emater, 2015a, Kato, 2015). 
Third, PES represent incentive-based instruments to reduce fires. An exemplar scheme was 
the Proambiente program, based on payment for avoided deforestation and multiple related 
ecosystem services including reduced wildfire risk. This program provided payment and 
technical support between 2004 and 2008 to enable four thousand smallholder households 
across the nine states of Legal Amazon to adopt fire-free practices (Hall, 2008, Neto, 2008, 
p.20, Wunder et al., 2009). Another example is the Bolsa Floresta program, which transfers 
cash to forest-dependent communities conditional on forest conservation and avoided carbon 
emissions. In some cases, transfers are conditional also on the control and reduction of fire 
use (Börner et al., 2013). However, at present PES programs in the Amazon are restricted to a 
few projects with only localized impacts. This contrasts with the growing number of papers 
arguing that incentive-based instruments are the best way to conserve tropical forests and 
control fires (e.g. through payments for reduced emissions from deforestation and 
degradation (REDD+; Barlow et al, 2012; Aragão and Shimabukuro, 2010). 
2.2 Simulated policy instruments  
                                                          
1
 In April 2014 and March-April 2015 meetings and interviews with key stakeholders were conducted 
comprising national coordination of PREVFOGO and also Pará state headquarters, a short interview with Pará 
state institution on environmental surveillance (IBAMA-PA) and Pará state institutions on agricultural research 
(EMBRAPA CPATU) and rural extension (EMATER). 
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The model simulates the impacts of simplified representations of three of the classes of policy 
instruments, namely the controlled burn law (i.e. command-and-control), a subsidy scheme 
for transition to fire-free agriculture through mechanization and PES schemes (technical 
details are found in appendices A and B). 
A command-and-control (C&C) instrument was simulated by assuming that the 
environmental authority bans and sanctions only “reckless fires”, i.e., agricultural fires with 
high probability of running out of control and turning into accidental fires. Accounting for the 
low spatial resolution (1 km
2
 cells) of remote-sensing fire detections that fire monitoring by 
the Brazilian government is based on (Vasconcelos et al., 2013, INPE, 2015, PREVFOGO, 
2015), the modelled landscape used in our simulations was divided into “monitoring zones” 
of 1 km
2
. Monitoring can only effectively identify fire-users where a zone intersects a single 
farm (as opposed to parts of multiple farms occupying the same zone). Reckless fires 
detected in single-farm zones (herein, enforcement-effective zones) generate a fine of fixed 
value per hectare which is applied to the owner. It is assumed that farmers know perfectly in 
which zones enforcement is effective. 
Second, subsidy schemes, also referred as “incentive-based instruments”, are represented as 
voluntary contracts of three modalities. Each modality targets the promotion of a specific mix 
of land use and technology (LUT) that can be developed in the parcels in which landscape is 
subdivided. This includes not only PES schemes but also the subsidy to fire-free agriculture 
(table 2). The agroforestry route is not modelled for consisting in complex mixes of crops, 
trees and cattle which take highly heterogeneous and mostly experimental forms in the 
literature (Serra, 2005, Arco-verde, 2008, MMA, 2009). 
The total annual subsidy received by a farmer is the product of the number of parcels with the 
target activity by a fixed per-hectare basis subsidy. All contracts have a five-year lifetime and 
are renewable indefinitely. Payment of subsidies occurs every year and is conditional on the 
compliance of contractual norms (table 2). If any norm is violated, the farmer must return all 
annual payments received since the start of the current contract. This stiff penalty of early 
contract termination is employed to assure time-consistency (Gulati and Vercammen, 2006). 
Table 2 [here] 
3 The model 
3.1 Presentation strategy 
Model presentation follows the “Overview, Design, Concepts and Details + Decision” 
(ODD+D) protocol for description of agent-based models proposed by Müeller et al (2013) 
and the structure adopted by Arfaoui et al (2014). It is intended that the findings of this paper 
could be relevant to researchers without formal background on computer modelling, and, also 
to practitioners, including policy-makers and NGOs. To better communicate with the target 
audience, the body of the text includes only the details essential for understanding results, 
limitations and conclusions. We first present the model from a conceptual perspective, 
emphasizing its goals, main features and theoretical foundations. The operational perspective, 
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i.e. the translation of concepts into an implementable procedure of algorithms and equations, 
is left to appendices and supplementary material. This simplified presentation strategy 
adheres to the fundamental ODD+D principle of gradually introducing the reader to model 
details. 
3.2 Description of the model 
Here we present a brief summary of the detailed description found in appendices A and B. 
3.2.1 Purpose 
The model is a tool to build knowledge on the impacts and limitations of command-and-
control and incentive-based policy instruments designed to control agricultural and accidental 
fires in the Brazilian Amazon. 
3.2.2 Entities, state variables and scales 
Four kinds of entities populate the model: farmers (decision-makers), parcels (spatial units), 
government and nature. 
There are four combinations of land use and technology (LUTs, herein) a land parcel can be 
allocated with. Three of them are agricultural land uses, namely, agriculture based on 
“controlled fires” (hereafter “controlled fires”), agriculture based on “reckless fires” and 
“fire-free agriculture” (herein “fire-free”). Reckless fires are conducted without any measure 
of control such as firebreak construction, burning against the wind or the avoidance of dry 
periods of the year. Controlled fires take place with the proper control measures, and fire-free 
agriculture without the use of fire. The remaining land use is forest. Parcels with agricultural 
LUTs can be converted to forest. In the year when the conversion is made, the parcel’s forest 
age is set to zero. Therefore, the amount of above-ground forest biomass accumulated in the 
parcel becomes positive only one year after conversion, which incorporates the delayed 
regeneration observed in practice (Neeff and Santos, 2005). 
Farmers decide the LUT portfolio that prevails on a particular set of parcels (farm). They are 
characterized by their (i) farm, i.e., the set of parcels controlled, (ii) wealth, (iii) accumulated 
local data on LUTs and accidental fires, (iv) point estimates for parameters behind the 
probability of accidental fires which is herein referred to as “risk” (see 3.2.3 below) and (v) 
status regarding subsidy contracts. 
Parcels are the basic units of space. They do not make decisions, but execute natural 
processes of forest growth and forest degradation by fire. Parcels are characterized by their (i) 
location, (ii) physical suitability (for agriculture), (iii) LUT, (iv) age of forest, (v) total above-
ground forest biomass (tons/hectare) and (vi) inclusion in an enforcement-effective zone. 
Attribute (ii) was calculated from GIS data, and is a metric for the contribution of three 
locational factors to parcel-level profit: parcel slope and Euclidian distances to nearest road 
and municipal capital respectively (SM.1). 
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Nature is an observer or “higher-level controller” (Grimm et al, 2010) that decides which 
parcels are affected by accidental fires at each time step. It is the only entity that knows the 
true risk parameters and also the values of the random component of parcels’ risk (see 
“define-burned-parcels in next subsection an on appendix B). The government is also an 
observer. It sanctions reckless fires in the C&C simulations and also offers and monitors 
voluntary contracts in the incentive-based simulations. 
Regarding scale, one time step represents one year, simulations were run for 40 years, one 




3.2.3 Process overview and scheduling 
There are three classes of simulations. Baseline simulations, in which no policy instrument is 
active, simulations in which only the C&C instrument is active and simulations in which only 
incentive-based instruments are active. The last class subdivides into three, each comprising a 
particular kind of subsidy contract (section 2.2 above). 
In baseline and C&C simulations, nine modules are processed in the following order: 
calculate-profit, implement-LUT-portfolio, LUC-cost-account, define-burned-parcels, 
sanction-rule-breakers, calculate-actual-profit, update-risk-parameters, store-LUT-portfolio-
in-memory, and update-forest-age-after-burn. In incentive-based simulations, the same 
procedures are processed together with two extra procedures: (i) subsidy-payment-account 
which is deployed right after "implement-LUT-portfolio" and; (ii) update-contract-duration, 
deployed right after "LUC-cost-account". 
The main features of the modules are described below  
Calculate-profit (figure 1) defines the LUT portfolio to be implemented in each time step 
using whole-farm expected profit optimization. Instead of seeking the best LUT portfolio 
globally, the algorithm identifies the best LUTs for each parcel locally by taking as given the 
best LUTs of neighboring parcels (queen criteria of contiguity was adopted). In other words, 
it makes assumptions about neighboring best LUTs. Since this profit-calculation is done 
sequentially for all parcels, the best LUTs of some neighboring parcels may not yet be 
defined (i.e., remain unknown) at the stage where the best LUT of a given parcel is to be 
defined. To mitigate against this, identification of best LUTs for all parcels is iterated until it 
stops yielding an increase in whole-farm expected profit. Due to limited wealth and the costs 
of changing between land-uses, farmers prioritize parcels with the highest degree of physical 
suitability. In incentive-based simulations, "calculate-profit" is subdivided into two sub-
procedures (route B of figure 1); one that imposes compliance to contract norms (“restricted 
identification”) and one that does not (“unrestricted identification”). Both these sub-
procedures are executed at every step, generating the information that forms the basis of 
farmers’ decisions on voluntary contracts. 
Define-burned-parcels defines the parcels that accidentally burn and is executed by nature. 
The probability that an accidental fire occurs on a given parcel, also called “risk”, is a 
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function of two classes of factors. First, variables indicating the parcel's own and neighboring 
parcels' LUTs. Second, fixed ‘risk parameters’ that measure the intensity with which LUTs 
influence risk. Whether an accidental fire occurs in a parcel is determined by the probability 
level (risk) and by a standard Gaussian disturbance representing non-observables behind risk.  
Further details, including the functional form linking LUTs with risk, are found on appendix 
B, section B.8 (with the complete description of the functional form detailed in appendix C. It 
is helpful to clarify that fire spread is not modelled. Accidental fire is conceived, for 
simplicity, as a point event, completely restricted to the parcel where it takes place. Parcels 
accidentally burned generate zero actual profit. For simplicity, it assumed that the above-
ground biomass of forested parcels is fully eliminated by accidental fires (defined as 
“functional deforestation” by Barlow et al., 2012).  
Update-risk-parameters is executed by farmers. Such entities are ignorant of true risk 
parameters but are able to estimate them. For this, they apply a statistical routine to 
accumulated local data on LUTs and accidental burns. Only their own parcels and parcels 
within 100 m of farm boundaries are observed by the farmers. At each time step, parameters 
are re-estimated after data update. 
Implement-LUT-portfolio assigns best LUTs for parcels processed by calculate-profit and 
previous LUTs for remaining parcels. This is preceded, in incentive-based simulations, by the 
choice between the LUT portfolio designed to comply with contract norms and the 
unrestricted LUT portfolio. The choice criterion is to pick the option with the highest whole-
farm expected profit. 
Update-contract-duration is only part of incentive-based simulations. It defines contract 
status in the basis of (i) LUT portfolio choice made in the previous procedure and (ii) current 
contract duration. The possible statuses or actions towards contracts are sign or don’t sign, 
keep or break, and renewal or exit 
3.2.4 Design concepts 
Theoretical and empirical background: profit and risk spillovers 
In new economic geography, the allocation of land for alternative uses is driven by 
“agglomerative” or “attractive” forces and “dispersive” or “repelling” forces (Fujita and 
Thisse, 2002, p.5, Irwin and Bockstael, 2001, Krugman, 1996). This principle is the basis of 
LUT choice in the model in our ABM. The forces that drive the agglomeration of agricultural 
LUTs are positive externalities associated with scale economies (Table 3). They affect LUT 
choice through the channel of profit (as letter “P” indicates), except for one of the forces that 
favor forest agglomeration, whose impact passes through the channel of risk (letter “R”). 
There are (at least) three categories of ecosystem services provided by forests. First, services 
which support food production, such as water and nutrient supply, soil conservation and 
climate regulation (Klemick, 2008, Chomitz and Kumari, 1996), as well as pollination and 
pest control (Tscharntke, 2005). Second, forested land also supports surrounding forested 
land, through avoiding or reducing edge and isolation effects (Laurance et al, 2006, Ferraz et 
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al, 2003, Stouffer and Bierregaard, 1995). It therefore seems valid to assume that availability 
of forest resources) in a forested unit of land increase with the amount of forest in the 
vicinity. Third, surrounding forests mitigate risk (Brando et al., 2013). The magnitudes in 
which forest services are provided, and the profit made out of forest products, are assumed to 
be positively correlated with above-ground biomass of the forest accumulated in the source 
parcel. 
It is assumed that risk increases with the agglomeration of fire-based agriculture. Since 
accidental fires impose economic losses to farmers, this assumption creates a force that favors 
dispersion of fire-based agriculture (table 3; better detailed in “expected profit function 
subsection” below). 
Table 3 [here] 
Empirical data 
The land property structure, initial location of forest and non-forested parcels and values for 
physical suitability come from empirical GIS data describing the condition in 2010 of a 10 x 
10 km square sub-area of Santarém municipality, in the Brazilian Amazon converted into a 
100 x 100 cell digital grid (figure 2, details on SM.1). Physical suitability is measured in 
terms of slope of terrain, distance to roads and urban centers. Land use change cost was 
estimated from secondary data (SM.2). Forest-growth follows the empirical above-biomass 
(logistic) growth function estimated by Neeff and Santos (2005). 
Figure 1 Flowchart for calculate-profit, baseline and command-and-control simulations 
(route A) and incentive-based simulations (route B). The agent executing the procedure is 




Figure 2 The modelled landscape in the Brazilian Amazon and the gridded version 
used in simulations 
 
 
Individual Decision Making: statement of the decision problem 
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Where parcels are indicated by k and the following definitions apply: r
e(.) ≡ expected profit 
function, ηk ≡ physical suitability, τk ≡ k-th parcel’s LUT, τk’≡ vector with LUTs of 
neighboring parcels owned by the i-th farmer, 𝜏𝑘
𝑒 ≡ vector with forecasted LUTs of 
neighboring parcels owned by other farmers, ?̂? ≡ vector with estimated parameters for the 
accidental fire prediction model (or “risk model”), γ ≡ vector with policy variables including 
LUT restrictions and magnitudes of subsidies and fines, C(.) ≡ LUT change cost (computed 
by “LUC-cost-account” procedure), τk,t-1 ≡ previous LUT, W ≡ wealth, f(.) ≡ function 
representing the estimation of ?̂?, D ≡ current data on observed accidental fires (automatically 
updated; see “update-contract-duration” above). 
In a nutshell, farmers choose the LUT portfolio that yields the highest farm-level expected 
profit, given the norms of prevailing policy (γ), knowledge on the likelihood (risk) of 
accidental fire occurrence (?̂?), forecasts for neighbors LUT choices (𝜏𝑘
𝑒), and the constraints 
imposed by the wealth (W) and the data on accidental fires (D) that could be accumulated. 
This optimization problem is not solved once-for-all but repeated at each time step, with the 
objective function being increased gradually by taking advantage of wealth and data 
accumulation - as current neighbors' LUTs are forecasted to equal previous period LUTs 
(table B.1), forecasting may also induce portfolio change. Also, the solution is based in an 
algorithm (calculate-profit) that proceeds from parcel-level LUTs to farm-level portfolio, 
cutting through the complexity of profit and risk spill-overs and the implied parcel-level 
spatial dependence. The algorithm also addressed the need to forecast LUT choices of 
farmers that control boundary parcels. 
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The model reduces to a computational implementation of the problem just described. Results 
generated are a set of solutions to the problem for all agents at all time steps. 
Individual Decision Making: solution of the decision problem 
The farmer’s decision problem is solved with the “calculate-profit” procedure (figure 1, 
section 3.2.3) which seeks to represent Amazonian farmers’ decision-making. Multiple 
studies attest the influence of capital on land use decisions, here called “wealth”, and of the 
parcel-scale factors determining physical suitability, being them slope of the terrain and 
distance to roads and urban centers (Deadman et al., 2004, Sorrensen, 2000 and 2004, Moran 
et al., 2002, Scatena et al., 1996, McCraken et al. 2002). In particular, the wealth allocation 
principle of giving priority to parcels whose costly conversion is, due to physical factors, 
more profitable, is supported by empirical evidence that proximity to roads, urban centers and 
flat terrain have positive effects on deforestation (Pfaff, 1999, Pfaff et al., 2007). 
The procedure is also designed as a bounded rationality shortcut to the search for the best 
among all possible portfolios, which amount to a number of alternatives whose order of 
magnitude is of 10
18
 for a 30-hectare farm, the smallest size considered. Two approaches to 
land use economics are reconciled by the LUT choice algorithm. The multi-output approach 
(e.g., Just et al, 1983, Fezzi and Bateman, 2011), for which farmers’ choice is guided by 
whole-farm profit, and the recent spatially-explicit models (e.g., Irwin and Bockstael, 2001, 
Parker and Meretsky, 2004), which emphasize heterogeneity and spatial externalities at 
parcel-level. 
Expected profit function 
Parcel-level expected profit function is r
e
 = ηθ(1-p) – C(.) + S(γ), with η ≡ physical 
suitability, θ ≡ deterministic profit, p ≡ probability of the parcel to be accidentally burned or 
simply “risk”, C(.) ≡ LUT change cost, S(γ) ≡ fine (negative value) or subsidy (positive 
value) assigned by policy. The main forces driving LUT choice in the model, the 
agglomerative and dispersive forces (table 3), are captured by two components, θ and p. To 
simplify language, only the product θ(1-p) is hereafter referred as “expected profit function”. 
The arguments of θ and p are metrics for three classes of variables, (i) own-parcel LUT, (ii) 
neighboring parcels’ LUTs, (iii) forest biomass either (iii.a) in the parcel (if occupied with 
forest) or (iii.b) in neighboring parcels. Details on the metrics and how they enter the 
functional forms of θ and p are provided in appendix C. Agglomerative and dispersive forces 
captured by θ are indicated with “[θ]” in table 3 and those captures by p with “[p]”. Expected 
profit functions are shown in figure 3. Farmers optimize an average of these functions 
weighted by physical suitability. For non-forest LUTs, the horizontal axis measures the 
degree of agglomeration in terms of neighboring parcels
2
 with the same LUT as the reference 
parcel. The higher the average forest biomass in neighboring parcels, the higher the curve. 
For the case of forest, the agglomeration degree is measured as neighboring parcels’ average 
above-ground biomass of forest. Higher curves represent higher levels of parcel’s own forest 
biomass. As the figure shows, expected profit functions are concave as agglomeration has 
                                                          
2
 With squared parcels, queen neighborhoods are made of 3, 5 or 8 parcels. 
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decreasing returns for all non-forest LUTs, what is in line with standard assumptions in 
economics (see, for instance, Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p.133-137, Varian, 1992, section 2.1, 
Doole and Kingwell, 2015, 2.1). This stems from the positive effect of agglomeration on both 
deterministic profit and risk. 
For the case of forest, agglomeration has opposite effects, positive for deterministic profit and 
negative for risk, yielding, thus, increasing returns. However, the expected profit of forest is 
concave in forest age, or equivalently, in own-parcel biomass, what stems from the logistic 
function driving forest growth (obtained from Neeff and Santos, 2002). Such concavity is 
attested by the bottom left of figure 3, where there is a decreasing distance in between two 
subsequent curves. Such is also the case for non-forest land uses. Consequently, the expected 
profits of all LUTs are concave in neighboring average forest biomass. 
Concavity is merely an expression, in the form of expected profit, of the more general idea of 
agglomerative and dispersive forces, in particular the forces specified in table 3. The optimal 
agglomeration level is the lowest for reckless fire as such LUT, by definition, has higher 
probabilities of turning into an accidental fire, for each agglomeration level. Also influent in 
such respect is a low level of scale economy (table 3). In contrast, fire-free has the highest 
optimal agglomeration level due to zero reliance on fire, and thus, low exposure to accidental 
fires and also to a high level of scale economy (table 3). All non-forest LUTs are supported 
by forest services, what explains the positive effect of surrounding forest biomass in their 
expected profits. Forest is subjected to returns from agglomeration as the process increases its 
capacity to generate services that provide self-support (table 3). The low expected profit 
forest is assumed to generate accounts for the still relevant deforestation level 
(~5,000km
2
/year, Godar et al., 2014) suggesting that forest is still seen as secondary in terms 
of economic return. 
Figure 3 Expected profit of the four LUTs as functions of agglomeration level 




Note: shifted curves correspond, from down to up, to the following levels of average forest biomass in the 
neighboring parcels: 56 (age of 11, inflection point of forest growth function, Neeff and Santos, 2002), 144.25 
(age of 25), 192.71 (age of 50).  
Figure 4 Expected profits of the three agricultural LUTs compared 
 
Learning 
Farmers learn about true risk parameters by re-estimating them every time step from 




Farmers interact among themselves only indirectly, mediated by parcels, and locally. 
3.2.5 Initialization 
The initial condition includes 26 farmers with heterogeneous farms. Each farmer has a set of 
estimated risk parameters and a level of wealth. In C&C simulations, parcels may also differ 
with regard to inclusion in enforcement-effective zones. All simulations, of all three kinds, 
have the same initial conditions, which are generated from GIS data on land property and 
forested and non-forested parcels. 
Clarifications on LUT assignment are needed. Initial LUTs are assigned to parcels before 
simulations were run by a landscape generating code which is separate from the model 
simulation code. This assures that all simulations depart from the same landscape, i.e., from 
the same LUTs for each of all ten thousand parcels. Initial LUTs are attributed first as 
forested or non-forested on the basis of the 2010 land use map of the Brazilian Amazon, 
developed by INPE-EMBRAPA (2012). In a second step, non-forested parcels are randomly 
assigned, with equal probability, to one of the three agricultural LUTs or zero-age forest 
(freshly abandoned land). Random assignment is inevitable as available remotely-sensed data 
does not allow for distinguishing the three forms of fire here considered namely, reckless, 
controlled and accidental. Satellite-derived data on fire hotspots (MODIS) only register point 
or area fire detections without any information on underlying land use or fire control 
measures (see user guides on UMD, 2016). Additionally, it is also not possible to precisely 
identify fire-free agriculture in INPE-EMBRAPA (2012). The assignment with uniform 
probability creates a checkerboard of non-forest LUTs that corresponds to the lowest degree 
of agglomeration. This gives opportunity for policy instruments to work, as higher degrees of 
agglomeration would restrict LUT change. 
3.2.6. Input Data 
The model does not use input data to represent time-varying processes. 
3.2.7 Submodels 
See appendix B.  
4 Results and discussion 
This section presents the criteria for analysing results and the analysis itself. Five potential 
lessons are proposed as hypotheses to guide empirical research. Three of them refer to the 
impact of the policy instruments, and the four remaining comprehend undesired side-effects. 
It is detailed how potential lessons stem from simulation results by showing patterns 
described by the main variables. 
4.1 Approach for analysing results 
4.1.1 General approach 
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The impact of policy instruments is conceived as a causal effect (in the sense of Morgan and 
Winship, 2007, chap.2), at landscape-level, on a set of outcome variables. It can be trivially 
calculated because the policy simulations (treatment states) differ from the baseline 
simulation (control state) strictly due to the presence of policy instruments. All exogenous 
variables, except those that characterize instruments, take the same values across all 
simulations and the few variables randomly assigned make no difference in outcomes
3
. 
Therefore, any difference in endogenous variables found by comparing baseline and policy 
simulations must therefore be the result of policy interventions.  
Additionally, only one voluntary contract is available in a given incentive-based simulation 
and none of them are available in simulations of command-and-control policy. This “single-
instrument” approach allows for capturing the individual effect of each instrument rather than 
the mixed effect of multiple instruments.  
The dynamics of the model requires a decision on the time window to be taken as the basis 
for calculating causal effects. Baseline and policy simulations may differ when compared 
step by step and thus the causal effect could also be calculated step-wise which would yield a 
short-run appreciation. But this study focusses on the long-run causal effects, which capture 
the net result, on each outcome variable, of direct and indirect effects of policy. The option 
for the long-run is in line with the literature on dynamic economic modelling of 
environmental policy (e.g., Van der Werf and Di Maria, 2012). 
The long run is assumed to start when the change in aggregate actual profit and land use 
become negligible (figure 5 below). However, absolute stagnation was never observed with 
negligible growth prevailing even after a large number (500) of iterations. The long run is 
assumed to start when aggregate profit has grown for less than 5% in the last five consecutive 
steps. All simulations reach that point at t = 40 at the latest (but generally well before that, 
see figure 5). This is, therefore, the reference step for computing long-run causal effects. The 
rationale for basing analysis on the long run relates to the fact that agents' best responses to 
policy instruments are observable only after LUT portfolios were optimized. The latter is 
indicated by profit and landscape stagnation, given the gradual improvement approach 
farmers follow (section 3.2.4 above). It should also be highlighted that it is in such period that 
constraints are less stringent, being them either wealth or data on accidental fires, and then 
response to policy becomes mainly a matter of choice. 
The policy instruments can be implemented in multiple “intensity levels”, as varying 
magnitudes of the fine and the subsidies. The set of intensity levels considered in simulations 
is L = {0.1,0.2,…,1}. All monetary values in the model are expressed as shares of the 
(landscape-wide) maximum parcel-level profit. Thus, a fine (subsidy) of $0.1/hectare reduces 
(increases) the profit yielded by a parcel in exactly 10% of the maximum parcel-level profit. 
                                                          
3
 There is only one class of exogenous variables assigned with a random number generator, the initial guesses 
for the eight parameters of the fire-risk model, which are the same, for a given farmer, in all simulations. The 
random component of accidental fires has zero, and, therefore, zero effect across the landscape. 
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In summary, the long run causal effect on the v-th outcome variable of the p-th instrument 
implemented in the l-th intensity level is δv
p,l
(t = 40) = Wv
0
(t = 40) -Wv
p,l
(t = 40), with the 
superscript “0” indicating the baseline simulation and W the level of the outcome variable. 
The three outcome variables considered are counts of parcels with a particular type of fire 
among (i) accidental fires, (ii) reckless fires and (iii) agricultural fires (reckless and controlled 
fires). Conclusively, the long run causal effects capture avoided fires of the three kinds 
detailed. 
Two of the instruments, C&C and mechanization, have a reach which is limited, in the spatial 
and social dimensions respectively. In contrast, all farmers were exposed to the two 
conservation instruments. To tackle different treatment groups, results are also presented for 
smallholders (farm size not above 200 hectares, which is the limit for mechanization) and 
medium-to-large landholders (farm area above 200 hectares; also denoted as “medium-to-
large”). 
Figure 5 Stagnation of aggregate profit (left) and landscape (right) before the long 




4.1.2 Sensitivity tests 
The robustness of the results to risk and deterministic profit parameters was assessed by 
introducing percent shocks of -50%, -25%, 25%, 50% and 100% to parameters. A sensitivity 
simulation is characterized by a parametric vector pair given by {α + Δα, β + Δβ} where α 
and β are, respectively, the parametric vectors for the deterministic profit and risk and Δ is 
the percent shock. Changing the ordering of parameters, would change the expected profit 
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ordering of LUTs, leading to simulations that are excessively different from the one whose 
results are evaluated in the main text (next subsection). To avoid this, all parameters of a 
class (risk or LUT) receive the same percent shock. The results are found in SM.3. 
4.2 Short-run dynamics 
The short-run dynamics of the model is synthesized by the trend of a single workhorse state 
variable, the average number of neighboring parcels with a given LUT. This measure for the 
agglomeration level determines the expected profits of the LUTs (section 3.2.4) and, 
therefore, the long-run LUT portfolios. The short run dynamics is a history of a race that is 
won in the very beginning (figure 6). The initial condition allocates the four LUTs randomly 
with uniform probability to non-forested parcels, resulting in an average agglomeration level 
of 1.10 parcels for agricultural LUTs
4
. For such agglomeration level, the LUT that yields the 
highest expected profit quickly becomes dominant in the baseline simulation (around t = 5) 
and remains so in the long run. Such is the case of reckless fire, which is the most profitable 
LUT up to an agglomeration level of 2 parcels (figure 4). 
In the baseline, it is observed a feedback in which the agglomeration and spatial diffusion of 
reckless fire reinforce each other. Such feedback is broken by policy instruments right in the 
first time step. Fines and subsidies work as exogenous shocks on the expected profit yielded 
by LUTs, overturning the advantage of reckless fire and opening space for the other two 
agricultural LUTs. In all policy simulations except Mechanization, which directly 
incentivizes fire-free, it is controlled fire that dominates in the long run (figure 6). 
Conservation, the only instrument without a restriction or subsidy against reckless fire, 
proved to be the least effective in reverting the LUT’s dominance. 
The baseline trend is consistent with studies advocating the existence of a self-sustaining 
dominance of fire use (fire lock-in) in the Brazilian Amazon, with emphasis in the 
dependence of smallholders on slash-and-burn agriculture (Costa, 2004, Nepstad et al, 2001, 
section 2, Cammelli, 2014, section 4.2.3). There are also widespread claims in the literature 
that, as our policy simulations show, intervention is needed in order to break the lock-in. This 
belief, adhering to the originally proposition of technological lock-in (Arthur, 1989), is also 
confirmed by research on fire use. In Börner’s et al (2007) simulations, policies promoting 
fire-free technologies and also taxing slash-and-burn proved successful. More recently, 
among smallholders participating in a PES program in Amazonas state, Börner et al (2013, 
p.56), found weak evidence of a reduction in deforestation, which probably means that the 
rate of expansion of slashed and burned area decreased. Van Vliet et al (2013) argue that 
policy based on conditional cash transfers has restrained shifting cultivation. 
A novelty of our paper is the process driving the agricultural fire lock-in, which connects the 
initial land use condition (an historical event in the sense of Arthur, 1982) with 
agglomeration induced by scale economies (spatially-explicit processes which create 
increasing returns also in line with Arthur, 1989). 
                                                          
4
 If forested parcels were not dominant in the initial condition, the number would be around 2 parcels. 
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Figure 6 Agglomeration level of agricultural LUTs, all simulations (baseline (A), 
C&C (B), Conservation (C), Conservation+ (D), Mechanization*(E)) 
 
Caption: solid line = reckless fires, solid line with triangles = controlled fires, dashed line = fire-free agriculture. 
Agglomeration level in the vertical axis. Note: For mechanization, only parcels belonging to smallholdings (the 
instruments’ target) were considered. 
 
4.3 Analysis of results 
Five main “potential lessons” synthesizing what could be learnt from the results are here 
presented and discussed. By “lessons” it is not meant recommendations to be put in practice 
but rather hypotheses about the impacts and limits of policy instruments whose validity is yet 
to be tested using empirical data. These potential lessons are robust to multiple values of 
parameters, as attested by sensitivity analysis (SM.3). 
4.3.1 Relative effectiveness of instruments 
The C&C instrument proved less effective to contain fires than incentive-based instruments 
(figure 7). This is mainly because C&C has a limited de facto spatial reach due to imperfect 
monitoring. It should not be understood as a proof of ineffectiveness. In fact, for all fine 
levels, the probabilities with which reckless and accidental fires occur were significantly 
lower in pixels belonging to enforcement-effective zones (p-value < 0.05 on the permutation 
test proposed by Röhmel, 1996). Contrariwise, total fires (either controlled or reckless) 
occurred with significantly higher probability within enforcement-effective zones (p-value < 
0.05). This last result shows, just like figure 6, that the ban of reckless fires may increase 
controlled fires. Additionally, while enforcement-effective zones are circumscribed to 21% of 
the landscape, partially intercepting only 9 of the 14 medium-to-large-sized farms and no 
smallholdings, the coverage of conservation contracts is above 70% of the landscape. 
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Effectively, the coarse spatial resolution of fire-monitoring frees smallholders from costly 
fines. Smallholders are only impacted by the C&C instrument indirectly, through spatial spill-
overs of the reactions of medium-to-large landholders, an effect with negligible magnitude 
(figure 7). This yields the first potential lesson (PL). 
(PL 1) If fire monitoring is based on remote sensing with low spatial resolution, banning 
reckless fire may exert low impact on accidental fires and on total fire use. Moreover, 
smallholders may remain unexposed to enforcement. 
This finding echoes that of Godar et al (2014), who show that smallholders are the social 
group least impacted by Brazilian deforestation policy due to the limited spatial resolution of 
deforestation monitoring and the political acceptability and cost-effectiveness . Additionally, 
Assunção et al (2013) argue that higher resolution monitoring would increase the 
effectiveness of deforestation policy. Finally, Börner et al (2015) found no statistically 
significant impact of field-based enforcement on deforestation of patches below 25 hectares, 
which is the current resolution of real time monitoring of deforestation in Brazil. 
In this study the mechanization subsidy performed best for all three outcome variables (figure 
7), considering only the social group exposed to it, namely, smallholders. Stimulating farmers 
to stop using fire, whether in a reckless or controlled manner, seems to be the most effective 
path to reduce accidental fires and, obviously, total fire use. Only in avoiding reckless fires, 
mechanization is matched by any other instrument, in particular conservation+. The latter is 
the only other incentive instrument that restricts fire use but, in contrast with mechanization 
incentives, it does not compensate for compliance. Consequently, we conclude that: 
(PL 2) Subsidies to shift from fire-based to mechanized agriculture may prove more effective 
in reducing fires than either C&C or conservation instruments. 
Effectiveness of the incentive was proportional to how directly it impacted fire use, as 
revealed by the impact rank of the three incentive instruments, which, for most of outcome 
variables and intensity levels, was, in decreasing order, mechanization, conservation+ and 
conservation (considering only groups exposed to the instrument). Conservation is the least 
direct instrument due to the absence of clauses regulating fire use, whereas conservation+ 
prevents reckless fire use only by incentivizing farmers to avoid converting 10 year old forest 
to reckless fires. Mechanization is the most direct instrument. Such results are compatible 
with the claim by Ferraro and Kiss (2002) that payments are most effective whether directly 
remunerating the desired environmental benefit.  
The almost negligible impact of C&C policy on smallholders (Table 4) do not mean 
ineffectiveness but instead reveal negligible exposure (treatment by policy) driven by limited 
enforcement. Analogously, the negligible impact of mechanization subsidies on medium-to 
large-farms is caused by the focus on smallholders. 
Interestingly, results show that the effect of policy instruments stops increasing with intensity 
above 0.2/ha level for C&C policy and above 0.4/ha, for incentive-based policy (figure 7). 
The stagnation is because it is only possible to change agents’ decisions through altering 
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incentives. The LUT choice is discrete and once a LUT is promoted to the top of the profit 
rank, further increasing its profitability exogenously does not change the rank and, therefore, 
incentives remain the same. This is consistent with theory which sustains that policy can only 
have its effectivity increased while there are open opportunities to change incentives (e.g. 
Becker, 1968). This “decreasing return” of instruments is especially relevant given that 
neither of them could reduce the accidental fire rate below 12% of the landscape from a 
baseline level of 26%. Consequently: 
(PL 3) Command-and-control and incentive-based instruments may be effective in altering 
land use and fire level, but such effectiveness is limited. 
Figure 7 Long run causal effects of instruments*, vertical axis: avoided fires 
measured as counts of parcels (hectares); horizontal axis: instrument intensity (fine or 
subsidy) 
 
Caption: “C&C” stands for command-and-control policy and “Con+”, “Con” and “Mech.” for the three 
incentive-based instruments (section 2.2). In each plot, the effects are shown for intensity levels from 0.1 to 1. 
4.3.2 Side-effects of instruments 
Conservation subsidies are effective to avoid deforestation but not degradation of forest by 
accidental fires if unaccompanied by a restriction on reckless fires (figure 8). However, such 
restriction, as a side effect, increases controlled fire area above the baseline reckless fire area 
(figure 6). There are two likely explanations for this outcome. First, since replacing reckless 
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fire is mandatory but not subsidized, farmers face the income loss imposed by the restriction 
as an opportunity cost of signing a conservation+ contract. Second, reckless and controlled 
fires are, respectively, the first and second most profitable LUTs in the initial condition of all 
simulations (section 4.2). Therefore, to compensate for the opportunity cost, reckless fire use 
and also the lower-ranked fire-free are replaced by controlled fire use. 
The compensation through disproportionate expansion of controlled fire use (see figure 6) 
can be understood by remembering that agglomeration of a LUT is driven by scale 
economies. Hence, the larger the area of controlled fire is, the more diluted is the fixed cost it 
incorporates. Making fire-breaks is an example of a fire control measure with fixed cost when 
aimed at protecting land uses outside the areas to be treated with fire. The relevance of this 
example is attested by the positive correlation between firebreak investment and value of land 
use under risk found by Bowman et al. (2008), who analysed data from a protected area in 
our study region, Santarém. 
If agricultural fires are seen as undesirable for other reasons beside accidental fire risk (e.g. 
smoke and derived air pollutants and GHGs, and soil degradation), results suggest that forest 
conservation payments are not the most efficient instruments to address the issue
5
. This is 
also true for C&C instrument as it considerably increased controlled fires (figure 6). Of 
course, a “conservation++” contract forbidding reckless fire and controlled fire could be 
designed, and it would probably be more effective at avoiding accidental fires, at least for 
farmers motivated to sign the contracts. However, the number of farmers entering the scheme 
would likely be smaller. This is supported by the fact that the total number of farmers willing 
to sign a forest conservation contract is smaller when reckless fire is forbidden and the 
payment is below 0.4/hectare (table 6). It is only above this value that the reckless fire 
restriction has no impact on the total number of signed contracts. 
Summing up, the incorporation of restrictions to fire use into PES programs in the Brazilian 
Amazon is necessary to assure an acceptable "return" for the payments, i.e. the quality of 
conserved forest. However, the simulations suggest that farmers need to be compensated for 
the cost of complying with restrictions in order to achieve the double PES goals of an 
acceptable return and desirable geographical reach. Without this, policy-makers would have 
to accept both a relevant level of agricultural fires and a reduced amount of land kept as 
forest. This finding leads to the fourth potential lesson. 
(PL 4) The conditioning of conservation payments on the prohibition of reckless fires may be 
effective to avoid subsidized forest from being accidentally burned. However, as a side-effect, 
controlled fires may increase considerably and the whole area of conserved forest might fall. 
The practical relevance of this potential lesson is attested by Leiva-Montoya’s (2013) 
interviews with participants of the ongoing PES program “Bolsa Floresta”. He found that 
77% of the interviewees judged the household-targeted payment insufficient to cover the 
costs of compliance with deforestation and fire use restrictions. In a relevant number of 
                                                          
5
 Moreover, in practice, during extreme droughts, as observed, for instance, in 2005, 2007 and 2010 (Stosic et 
al., 2016), controlled fires may become reckless fires, a possibility not modelled. 
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programs (see Pattanayk et al. 2010, Appendix table 2), compliance monitoring is imperfect 
and detection of violations is probabilistic. If payments partially cover compliance cost, 
theoretically (see Ferraro, 2008, p.811), partial compliance would tend to prevail at a level in 
which its cost balances payments. 
Still, that fires may undermine environmental gains brought by incentives to avoid 
deforestation is argued by Friess et al (2015), Aragão and Shimabukuro (2010) and Barlow et 
al (2012). Their results show a clear need to introduce fire restrictions in REDD programs. 
This is already taking place in the Juruá and Rio Negro protected areas of Amazonas (Börner 
et al, 2013, p.18, Leiva-Montoya, 2013 p.38), where payments for forest conservation are 
conditional on the adoption of fire control measures (e.g. firebreaks ) and on norms restricting 
the frequency and extent of burning (Börner et al, 2013). 
Now, turning to the mechanization instrument, it quadruples fire-free area, promoting the 
LUT to a degree of diffusion (16%) that has no parallel in the other simulations (figure 6). It 
is also observed a significant shift from fire-based to fire-free agriculture. In the baseline, the 
area occupied by the former is 18 times larger than the area occupied by the latter. However, 
with a mechanization subsidy of R$0.4, fire-based area is only 3 times larger than that of fire-
free. 
Even with such major impact on the fire-free area, only marginal unwanted indirect land use 
change could be found at farms exposed to the subsidy (see SM.3 table SM.3.13). In the case 
of the mechanization instrument, the unwanted indirect land use change is the replacement of 
forests by fire-free, which, even though not incentivized, is not ruled out by the contract and 
could theoretically happen due to the high agglomerative potential of fire-free. But the side-
effect is not driven by spill-overs. It is, indeed, very straightforward. Smallholders explore 
the possibility of converting forest to fire-free in the first period in order to start receiving the 
mechanization subsidy in the third period. It is exactly what happens in the sensitivity 
simulation with highest share of indirect land use (table SM.3.13).  
This side-effect should not be thought as irrelevant for being caused by a caveat in 
contractual rules. In theory, the issue could be solved by not remunerating the keeping of fire-
free, except in parcels where the LUT replaced fire-based agriculture. However, the fire-
based agriculture currently replaced may have taken the place of forest. To solve the problem 
in practice, recently deforested parcels should be not remunerated, but, still, the definition of 
"recently" may be a matter of dispute. 
In practice, the evidence of deforestation through indirect land use change is more notorious 
than model’s results reveal. Barona et al (2010) and Arima et al (2011) attest the occurrence 
of indirect deforestation induced by the expansion of fire-free and mechanized soybean 
growing in Brazilian Amazon. Wunder (2006) considers the possibility of PFES fostering the 
increase in cattle numbers, one of the main drivers of tropical deforestation, through the 
channel of capitalization which expands when farmers start being remunerated for leaving 
land plots idle to grow forests. Nevertheless, our results suggest that indirect deforestation 
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can be considerably mitigated if only a particular land use change, which does not, obviously, 
coincides with deforestation, is accurately subsidized. Synthesizing the discussion: 
(PL 5) Indirect deforestation induced by mechanization subsidy may be kept low if the 
conversion of forests to mechanized agriculture is not direcly subsidized. 
However, mechanization may also have negative social and environmental impacts 
depending on how it is introduced. If cash flow and credit access are below the levels 
required for regular and minimum fertilizer application, income will fall in the short term. It 
will also fall in the long term when soils worn-out by slash-and-burn are not rehabilitated 
before tractor introduction, which can only lead to further degradation (Reichert et al., 2014). 
A mechanization subsidy, thus, has to cover the cost of sustainable soil management required 
by tractor introduction. 
Figure 8 Counts of forested parcels accidentally burnt, only subsidized parcels 




Table 6 [here] 






Without public action, the current number of ignitions by farmers, combined with increased 
drought hazard and fire-prone vegetation, seems set to lead to disastrous wildfires, 
biodiversity loss, GHG emissions, and the spread of health-damaging pollutants (Balch, 
2014, Jacobson et al., 2014, Malhi et al., 2009, Davidson et al, 2012). Alarmingly, there is no 
clear evidence that current Brazilian fire policies are promoting a relevant reduction of 
Amazon fires (see Sorrensen, 2009, Carmenta et al., 2013, Arima et al., 2007 and Costa, 
2004). To better understand the impacts and limitations of policy options, we developed and 
applied an analytical tool to a small fraction of the Brazilian Amazon, identifying five 
potential lessons. The instruments evaluated cover a relevant fraction of the menu of choices 
in practice faced by policymakers, ranging from a negative incentive to abandon only 
reckless fires (C&C instrument), where compliance cost is fully borne by landholders, to a 
positive incentive where government fully pays for the cost of ceasing to use both reckless 
and controlled fires (mechanization). 
For the social groups exposed to them, all policy instruments proved effective in overturning 
the predominance of highly profitable and risky fire use and also in decreasing accidental 
fires. However, none of them were free from imperfections. A ban enforced with fines 
performed worse than incentive-based instruments due to inadequate monitoring of 
compliance, leaving smallholders immune to sanctions. Forest conservation subsidies 
avoided deforestation but not forest degradation by fire. Such subsidies, when made 
conditional on the avoidance of reckless fires, did ensure reduced forest degradation, but the 
price paid was increased controlled fire use and less avoided deforestation. A subsidy to shift 
from fire-based to fire-free agriculture was the most effective instrument to avoid fire use and 
accidental fires, but it indirectly incentivised deforestation. Furthermore, for most intensity 
levels, the instruments that were more effective at reducing deforestation were not more 
effective at reducing fires, and vice versa (table 7). Thus, even within the wide spectrum of 
policy options examined, an instrument to achieve, with high impact, the double goal of total 
fire reduction and forest protection could not be found (except for intensity levels 0.1 and 0.2, 
see table 7). This is likely due to the impossibility of achieving multiple goals with a single 
instrument, as the Tinbergen rule proposes (Knudson, 2009). 
Finally, due to the artificial nature of the data generated by the simulations, the results 
obtained are far from definitive, and only a point of departure for empirical research aimed at 
refuting the lessons learned. Nevertheless, the study has contributed a crucial first step 
towards analysing the impacts of policy on Amazonian fires by providing clear-cut 
hypotheses for further study. 
It must be highlighted that results can only be extrapolated to post-frontier subregions of 
Amazon characterized by (i) widespread use of fire (lesson 1), (ii) predominance of medium-
sized farms of 300-1100 hectares (SM.1), (iii) tenure security (farm boundaries are static 
across simulations) and (iv) effective enforcement of deforestation policy. The last point 
follows from the baseline average annual deforestation of 1% (40% in 40 steps), which is 
approximately equal to the actual municipal average after enforcement intensification (from 
2005 to 2013). Smallholders are imprecisely represented with regard to farm geometry 
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(SM.1) and results involving them can only be extrapolated, with care, for the subgroup of 
farms from between 100 and 200 hectares. 
Limitations, to be addressed by future work, remain. First, the policy-implementing agency, 
i.e., the government, should be properly modelled, especially with regard to its budget and 
social welfare preferences. Secondly, channels through which climate change impacts on land 
use profits and fire risk should also be introduced, since the random component of accidental 
fires is unable to reproduce some of the trends increasingly recognized by the literature as 
forest flammability amplifiers (see Malhi et al., 2009, Coe et al., 2013, Davidson et al., 2012 
and Aragão et al., 2008). Also, it remains to be tested the implications of decision making 
algorithms based on dynamic optimization. Direct interaction of agents, through 
communication among neighbors, for instance, is also an avenue to be explored by future 
work. Both extensions may influence results by increasing agents' ability to anticipate the 





Appendix A ODD+D description of the model 
I.Overview 
I.i Purpose 
I.i.a What is the purpose of the study? The model is a tool to build knowledge on the impacts 
and limitations of command-and-control and incentive-based policy instruments designed to 
control agricultural and accidental fires in the Brazilian Amazon. 
I.ii.b For whom is the model designed? Researchers of Amazon fires and policy-makers 
I.ii Entities, state variables, and scales 
I.ii.a What kinds of entities are in the model? Four kinds of entities. First, the decision makers 
that manage land, called "farmers". Second, spatial units, called "parcels". The latter kind of 
entity does not make decisions, but executes natural processes (forest growth, forest 
degradation, etc.) and is employed by farmers to process calculations required by land use 
and technology (LUT) choice. Third, an observer entity, called "nature", decides which 
parcels accidentally burn. Fourth, an observer entity, called "government", sanctions reckless 
fires in the command-and-control policy scenario and offers and monitors voluntary contracts 
in the incentive-based policy scenarios. 
I.ii.b By what attributes (i.e. state variables and parameters) are these entities characterized? 
(immutable initial conditions, which are equal across all simulations, are denoted by "[i.i.c]"; 
state variables, by “[s]”). 
(1) Farmers are characterized by: (1.a) Farm, i.e., set of parcels controlled [i.i.c]; (1.b) LUT 
portfolio choice [s]; (1.c) wealth or accumulated stock of whole-farm profits [s]; (1.d) point 
estimates for risk parameters [s]; (1.e) accumulated local data on fires and LUTs [s]; (1.f) 
contract status (regarding incentive-based instruments) [s]; 
(2) Parcels are characterized by: (2.a) location [i.i.c]; (2.b) farmer in control [i.i.c]; (2.c) 
physical suitability [p]; (2.c) LUT [s]; (2.d) age of forest, (2.e) above-ground forest biomass 
(AGB) [s]; (2.f) inclusion in enforcement-effective zone [i.i.c]; (2.g) whether accidentally 
burned or not [s]; 
(3) Nature is characterized by: (3.a) true risk parameters [i.i.c]; (3.b) values for standard 
Gaussian disturbance behind accidental fires [s]; 
(4) Government is characterized by: (4.a) Active policy instrument [i.i.c]; (4.b) level of 
intensity for policy (value of fine or subsidy) [i.i.c]. 
I.ii.c What are the exogenous factors / drivers of the model? All attributes of nature and 
government (see I.ii.b) and the parameters capturing the effect of LUT agglomeration and 
dispersion on deterministic profit and risk. 
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I.ii.d If applicable, how is space included in the model? With a two dimensional flat 
landscape whose basic unit is an autonomous processing unit referred as "parcel". The model 
is spatially explicit and operates in a landscape whose division among private owners comes 
from real data (Rural Environmental Land Registry, SM.1) and remains fixed across 
simulations. The initial condition for land use is also partially defined by data. 
I.ii.e What are the temporal and spatial resolutions and extents of the model? One time step 
represents one year, simulations were run for 40 years, one grid cell represents 1 ha and the 
model landscape comprises 100 x 100 hectares. 
I.iii Process overview and scheduling 
I.iii.a What entity does what, and in what order? (names of procedures are preceded by an 
indication of the entities that run them, as follows: [F] for farmer, [P] for parcel, [G] for 
government and [N] for nature) 
(A) In baseline and command-and-control policy simulations, the following nine modules are 
executed in the following order: [P&F] calculate-profit, [P&F] implement-LUT-portfolio, [F] 
LUC-cost-account, [N] define-burned-parcels, [G] sanction-rulebreakers, [F] calculate-
actual-profit, [F] update-risk-parameters, [F] store-LUT-portfolio-in-memory, [P] update-
forest-age-after-burn.  
The first iteration differs only regarding the absence of the procedure "update-risk-model-
parameters" (since farmers have no local data at t = 0). 
(B) In incentive-based policy simulations, the same procedures are processed together with 
two extra procedures: (i) [F] subsidy-payment-account which is deployed right after 
"implement-LUT-portfolio" and; (ii) [F] update-contract-duration, deployed right after 
"LUC-cost-account". In procedure (ii), decisions on signing, keeping and renewing a subsidy 
contract are made. One additional peculiarity of incentive-based simulations is that the 
"calculate-profit" procedure is subdivided in two sub-procedures, one calculates profit 
without imposing compliance with contract rules and the other forces compliance (B.1 and 
B.2 of appendix B). 
II. Design concepts 
II.i.a Which general concepts, theories or hypotheses are underlying the model’s design at the 
system level or at the level(s) of the submodel(s) (apart from the decision model)? What is 
the link to complexity and the purpose of the model? 
Agglomerative and dispersive forces driving land use, from the theory of new economic 
geography (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, Irwin and Bockstael, 2001, Krugman, 1996); Forest 
ecosystem services, including protection from accidental fire, discussed in the literature of 
land use, ecology and forestry (Klemick, 2008, Chomitz and Kumari, 1996, Tscharntke, 
2005, Laurance et al, 2006, Ferraz et al, 2003, Stouffer and Bierregaard, 1995, Peres and 
Lake, 2003, Brando et al., 2013); Whole-farm profit as the index that guides land allocation 
decision, assumed by traditional agricultural economics models (Just et al., 1983, Fezzi and 
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Bateman, 2011); Parcel-level heterogeneity and spatial externalities of land uses (Irwin and 
Bockstael, 2001, Parker and Meretsky, 2004). 
II.i.b On what assumptions is/are the agents’ decision model(s) based?  
Farmers are boundedly rational and choose LUT portfolio in the basis of a local (parcel-level) 
optimization procedure adjusted to incorporate farm-level information; Current wealth is a 
limiting factor of LUT portfolio change due to cost of land use change; It is necessary to form 
expectations on the LUTs to be developed at third-party parcels in the neighborhood of farm 
boundaries. This is done by assuming that previous step LUTs will be kept; Farmers are 
ignorant of true risk parameters and the value of the random disturbance behind accidental 
fires; Data for estimating risk parameters is collected locally and accumulated stepwise over 
time. 
II.i.c Why is a/are certain decision model(s) chosen? There are two reasons. First, standard 
global optimization, i.e., finding the best among all possible portfolios is highly computing-
intensive. Once there are four LUTs, the number of alternative portfolios is equal to four 
elevated to a power equal to farm’s area. For a 30 hectare farm, the smallest farm size in the 
model, the number of potential portfolios has an order of magnitude of 10
18
.Second, 
empirical studies of Amazon farmers' behavior show that land management decisions are 
driven by parcel-scale factors and limited by capital/wealth (Deadman et al., 2004, Sorrensen, 
2000 and 2004, Moran et al., 2002, Scatena et al., 1996, McCraken et al. 2002).  In particular, 
econometric results (e.g., Pfaff, 1999, Pfaff et al., 2007), reveal that proximity to roads, urban 
centers and low inclination of land, the three variables captured by the model's physical 
suitability, positively influence the conversion of forests to agriculture. This causality is the 
basis of the model's wealth allocation principle of giving priority to parcels whose costly 
conversion is, due to physical factors, more profitable. 
II.i.d If the model / a submodel (e.g. the decision model) is based on empirical data, where 
does the data come from? The LUT choice algorithm processes information of two basic 
parcel-level mathematical functions which report levels of risk and of deterministic profit as 
functions of own-parcel and neighboring parcels' LUTs (appendix C); The parameters of 
deterministic profit are calculated in the basis of five principles, which refer to spatial spill-
overs of forest ecosystem services, scale economies, and land use change costs that were 
estimated from data (see appendix C); The risk parameters are also calculated on the basis of 
(six) principles grounded in the specific literature (appendix C); Forest-growth follows the 
empirical above-biomass growth function estimated by Neeff and Santos (2005); The policy 
instruments are based on concrete policy actions (see section 2.1). They include a simplified 
version of Brazilian controlled-burn law, two incentive-based instruments inspired by 
concrete PFES programs and one incentive-based instrument based on municipal 
mechanization subsidy programs (section 2); The landscape is designed to capture 
characteristics of a 10km
2
 squared zone of Santarém municipality, Brazilian Amazon (SM.1); 
GIS data of Santarém municipality define (i) the land property structure, (ii) the initial status 
of parcels regarding presence and absence of forest and (iii) the physical suitability of parcels 
for agriculture (SM.1). 
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II.i.e At which level of aggregation were the data available? Land use change cost data: at the 
level of production factors (man-days, input quantities/output, etc.), see SM.2; Forest growth 
model: at the parcel (stand) level; Land property and initial land use data: parcel level, 30 m 
resolution data. 
II.ii Individual Decision Making 
II.ii.a What are the subjects and objects of decision-making? On which level of aggregation is 
decision-making modeled? Are multiple levels of decision making included? Farmers decide 
on the allocation of parcels among alternative LUTs. Nature decides, based on LUT 
configuration, which parcels accidentally burn. No other entity is capable of decision making. 
Government only implements pre-defined rules regarding farmer sanctioning. 
II.ii.b What is the basic rationality behind agents’ decision-making in the model? Do agents 
pursue an explicit objective or have other success criteria? Farmers are boundedly rational 
and seek the portfolio that maximizes whole-farm expected profit. Nature is substantively 
rational in the sense it does not face barriers for gathering and processing information but has 
no particular goal. Government does not follow a decision model, it simply implement rules 
(non-deliberate action). 
II.ii.c How do agents make their decisions? Se II.ii.a and II.i.b above and appendix B. 
II.ii.d Do the agents adapt their behavior to changing endogenous and exogenous state 
variables? And if yes, how? ("exo" stands for exogenous variables and "endo" for 
endogenous). 
Yes, farmers adapt to: (1) LUTs of third-party parcels (exo), which create profit and risk 
spill-overs that influence LUT allocation at the boundary of farms; (2) Knowledge of the true 
process behind accidental burns, measured by accumulated local data on LUTs and accidental 
fires (endo. and exo.). This drives change of LUT portfolios due to changed perceived risk 
associated with LUT mosaics; (3) Own-wealth (endo.), which, being updated by whole-farm 
profit, becomes less stringent as a constraint on chosen portfolios; (4) Forest growth (exo.), 
which engenders profit and risk spill-overs that may lead farmers to reconsider LUT 
portfolios and their statuses regarding conservation contracts. 
II.ii.e Do social norms or cultural values play a role in the decision-making process? No, 
there is no direct interaction among farmers and institutions are abstracted (apart from policy 
which is immutable during simulations). 
II.ii.f Do spatial aspects play a role in the decision process? Yes, a crucial role through spill-
overs of parcel-level risk and profit and also by signaling to agents that accidental burns 
emerge (also) from particular spatial configurations of LUTs. 
II.ii.g Do temporal aspects play a role in the decision process? Yes, time affects decisions 
through the dynamics of four stocks, wealth, local data, forest biomass and accumulated 
payments from subsidy contracts. Also, subsidy contracts have a finite five-year duration. 
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II.ii.h To which extent and how is uncertainty included in the agents’ decision rules? Agents 
face two sources of uncertainty while searching for the best LUT portfolio. First, the best 
LUT portfolio of neighbors is unknown. Second, there is the uncertainty related with the true 
generating process behind accidental burns coming from (i) ignorance of the true risk 
parameters and (ii) randomness of unobservables. While (i) is mitigated with the 
accumulation of local data, (ii) is irreducible, and, therefore, accidental burns are always 
uncertain events in the model, even after farmers’ point estimates for risk parameters have 
become sufficiently close to true values. 
 
II.iii Learning 
II.iii.a Is individual learning included in the decision process? How do individuals change 
their decision rules over time as a consequence of their experience? Yes, farmers learn about 
the true process behind accidental burns, as described in appendix B, B.13. 
II.iii.b Is collective learning implemented in the model? No. 
II.iv Individual Sensing 
II.iv.a What endogenous and exogenous state variables are individuals assumed to sense and 
consider in their decisions? Is the sensing process erroneous? Farmers sense the risk of 
accidental burns associated with LUT configurations. This sensing is improved with local 
data accumulation but may prove wrong when estimates of risk parameters do not match the 
true values which are known only by nature. 
II.iv.b What state variables of which other individuals can an individual perceive? Is the 
sensing process erroneous? Farmers observe the behavior of neighbors, but exclusively with 
regard to LUTs allocated to parcels bordering their own farm. On the basis of this, they try to 
forecast current LUTs of such proximate third-party parcels, but such forecasts may prove 
wrong. 
II.iv.c What is the spatial scale of sensing? Local, parcel scale, restricted to own-parcels and 
third-party parcels within 100 meters from farm boundaries. 
II.iv.d Are the mechanisms by which agents obtain information modelled explicitly, or are 
individuals simply assumed to know these variables? 
(1) Farmers: (1.a) The mechanism of accumulation of information on accidental fires and 
LUTs is modelled explicitly. It is assumed that farmers know the specification of the true 
function behind accidental burns, which is a standard probit and estimate the parameters with 
local data; (1.b) Information on LUTs of proximate third-party parcels is obtained through 
direct observation; 
(2) Nature and government know all the information they need to act. 
II.iv.e Are costs for cognition and costs for gathering information included in the model? No. 
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II.v Individual Prediction 
II.v.a Which data uses the agent to predict future conditions? Predictions of the future are not 
part of the model. 
II.v.b What internal models are agents assumed to use to estimate future conditions or 
consequences of their decisions? Parcel-level and whole-farm profits are estimated, since two 
of the three classes of factors behind accidental fires are only known by nature. Every time 
step, farmers calculate expected profit for each LUT at each parcel and also for the whole-
farm LUT portfolio. This is done by considering a parcel-level expected profit function given 
by r
e
 = ηθ(1-p) – C(.) + S(γ) with η ≡ physical suitability, θ ≡ deterministic profit, p ≡ risk, 
C(.) ≡ LUT change cost, S(γ) ≡ fine (negative value) or subsidy (positive value) assigned by 
policy  (see B.1 and B.2 of appendix B). 
II.v.c Might agents be erroneous in the prediction process, and how is it implemented? Yes, 
point estimates for risk parameters may prove wrong, but it is impossible for agents to know 
because they are ignorant of the true model. They do not try to improve estimates on the basis 
of prediction error, but, without deliberation, follow a process of periodic re-estimation based 
on their stepwise expanded stock of local data. 
II.vi Interaction 
II.vi.a Are interactions among agents and entities assumed as direct or indirect? Farmers 
interact only indirectly and locally. Two are the channels through which interactions occur. 
The first is the forecast of LUTs of proximate neighbors’ parcels. The second is the spill-over 
of dispersive and agglomerative forces across farm boundaries. The profit and risk of a LUT, 
when developed in a given parcel, depend on the LUTs adopted in all eight (queen) 
neighboring parcels, whether owned by the same agent or not. Therefore, agglomerative and 
dispersive forces transcend the limits of land property. 
II.vi.b On what do the interactions depend? Proximity, since only neighbors interact 
(indirectly). 
II.vi.c If the interactions involve communication, how are such communications represented? 
N/A 
II.vi.d If a coordination network exists, how does it affect the agent behaviour? Is the 
structure of the network imposed or emergent? N/A 
II.vii Collectives 
II.vii.a Do the individuals form or belong to aggregations that affect, and are affected by, the 
individuals? Are these aggregations imposed by the modeller or do they emerge during the 
simulation? No, action is purely individual. 




II.viii.a Are the agents heterogeneous? If yes, which state variables and/or processes differ 
between the agents?  
(1) Farmers are heterogeneous regarding: (1.a) Farm, i.e., location and number of parcels 
controlled; (1.b) Initial condition for wealth and LUT portfolio; (1.c) Initial guesses for 
parameters of the risk model;  (1.d) Share of farm included in enforcement-effective zones 
(command-and-control policy); 
(2) Parcels differ with regard to: (2.a) Location; (2.b) physical suitability; (2.b) Number of 
neighbors (parcels at the corner of the landscape have less than 8 neighbors in their queen 
neighborhood); (2.c) Initial condition for above-ground forest biomass (AGB); (2.d) 
Inclusion in to enforcement-effective zone (command-and-control policy). 
II.viii.b Are the agents heterogeneous in their decision-making? If yes, which decision 
models or decision objects differ between the agents? No. 
II.ix Stochasticity 
II.ix.a What processes (including initialization) are modeled by assuming they are random or 
partly random?  
There are three sets of variables randomly assigned. (1) Initial LUTs are partly randomly 
assigned. Forest and non-forest areas are defined by data. Within a non-forest area, LUTs are 
assigned with a random number generator. This initial configuration is the same across all 
simulations (including all policy instruments and intensity levels and also sensitivity 
simulations, SM.3); (2) Initial guesses for the parameters of the risk model are randomly 
assigned for each farmer, and drawn with uniform probability from intervals of ± 20% around 
true values; (3) The random component of parcel-level flammability is drawn from the 
standard Gaussian cdf at each step with one particular value for each parcel. 
II.x Observation 
II.x.a What data are collected from the agent-based model (ABM) for testing, understanding, 
and analyzing it, and how and when are they collected? The data collected comprises 
measures of causal effects of policy instruments, including three outcome variables each 
capturing counts of parcels with a particular type of fire (section 4.1). By "causal effects" is 
understood the difference of outcome variables comparing simulations with and without 
active policy instrument exclusively in terms of their final step (understood as the long run 
equilibrium, t = 40). Data is collected with R software ("RNetLogo" package) by running the 
ABM and storing the main results of all steps of simulations. Thereafter, the causal effects 
are calculated by comparing data on baseline and policy simulations. By simulation it is 
understood a set of 40 iterations of the ABM algorithm characterized by particular values of 
(i) active policy instrument (if any), (ii) policy instrument intensity level, (iii) risk and 




II.x.b What key results, outputs or characteristics of the model are emerging from the 
individuals? (Emergence) The patterns described by causal effects lead to conclusions on the 
impacts and limitations of policies, which can be seen as emergent properties since they are 
aggregates across the whole landscape and also within two groups of farmers defined by farm 
size (see section 4.1). The spatial configuration of LUTs, including reckless and controlled 
fires and also accidental fires is also an emergent property which differs depending on the 
active policy instrument. 
III.Details 
III.i Implementation Details 
III.i.a How has the model been implemented? The model code is written in NetLogo 5.1.0 
and simulations were run with loops programmed in R (RNetLogo package, Thiele, 2014). 
III.i.b Is the model accessible and if so where? The model code is sent, in four ASCII files 
(including a readme file), with this paper as part of the supplementary material (e-content). 
III.ii Initialization 
III.ii.a What is the initial state of the model world, i.e. at time t=0 of a simulation run? 26 
farmers with heterogeneous farms, guesses for risk parameters and wealth. Ten thousand 
parcels with heterogeneous LUT statuses. In command-and-control simulations the inclusion 
in enforcement-effective zone is also a characteristic in which parcels differ. 
III.ii.b Is initialization always the same, or is it allowed to vary among simulations? Always 
the same, except for guesses for risk parameters. 
III.ii.c Are the initial values chosen arbitrarily or based on data? See II.ix. 
III.iii Input Data 
III.iii.a Does the model use input from external sources such as data files or other models to 
represent processes that change over time? No. 
III.iv Submodels 
III.iv.a What, in detail, are the submodels that represent the processes listed in ‘Process 
overview and scheduling’? See appendix B. 
III.iv.b What are the model parameters, their dimensions and reference values? See appendix 
C. 
III.iv.c How were submodels designed or chosen, and how were they parameterized and then 




Appendix B Submodels 
This appendix details the submodels or procedures of the model’s algorithm. Sections B.0 to 
B.15 present all procedures processed by the three categories of simulations. The exact 
sequences in which procedures are executed in particular simulation categories are presented 
in section B.16. 
B.0 Initialization 
B.0.1 [N] setup-landscape 
(1) True risk parameters and the deterministic profit parameters are set by following 
conventions from appendix C; 
(2) GIS data on land property and forested and non-forested parcels are imported and 
incorporated to the landscape. The data embodies adjustments described in SM.1. Further 
adjustments to eliminate property overlaps are made; 
(3) Non-forested parcels have their LUT assigned by randomly drawing with uniform 
probability from the set {0, 1, 2, 3} with 0 standing for reckless fire, 1 for controlled fire, 2 
for fire-free and 3 for freshly-abandoned land (forest with age zero); 
(4) Forested parcels have their forest age attributed by randomly drawing with uniform 
probability from the set {5, 10, 25, 50, 100}; 
(5) Above-ground biomass of forested parcels is calculated from forest age using the 
empirical growth model proposed by Neeff and Santos (2005). 
Note: the results generated by setup-landscape are used, without any alteration, in all 
simulations. The procedure is, thus, ran only once before all simulations. 
B.0.2 [N&F&P] setup-farmers 
(1) A number of agents “farmers”, equalling the number of properties is created. There is 
only one farmer holding the code that identifies the set of parcels belonging to a given farm; 
(2) Initial guesses for risk parameters are calculated. In the first step the lack of data to 
conduct estimations is circumvented with initial guesses in which values for parameters are 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution, defined to be in the interval [0.8βj; 1.2βj], j = 
0,…,5. Thus, the maximum error agents start with is ±20%; 
(3) Farmers are moved to the centroid of the respective farm and do not move across 
simulations;  
(4) Initial wealth is assigned as the actual profit yielded by the initial LUT portfolio under the 
assumption that, in t = 0, no parcel is affected by an accidental fire. 




The landscape is subdivided into 100 square zones of 10 x 10 parcels or 1km
2
. Zones 
intercepted by only one farm are defined as enforcement-effective (EE) zones and it is only in 
these zones that reckless fire is sanctioned in command-and-control simulations. 
B.1 [P&F] calculate-profit (as executed in baseline and command-and-control 
simulations) 
Calculate-profit consists of five sub-procedures, as follows. 
B.1.1 [F] generation of parcel list 
In each time step, farmers list parcels in descending order of physical suitability, ηk. As 
described in the next sub-procedures, the best-LUTs of each of the listed parcels are 
identified. The list is traversed until the accumulated cost of converting parcels to the best 
LUTs equals the level of available wealth or the end of the list is reached. 
B.1.2 [P] Assumptions on best LUTs of neighboring parcels 
Procedure: parcels make assumptions on neighbors’ current LUTs and AGBs, following two 
criteria: 
(1.i) neighboring parcels that fit the category “inside listed above” (cf. table B.1) are 
assumed to implement best LUTs and associated AGBs; 
(1.ii) remaining neighboring parcels are assumed to implement previous LUTs and 
one-period-updated above-ground biomasses (AGBs). 
Explanation: the agglomerative and dispersive forces behind risk and deterministic profit, as 
well as the list approach, both make local optimization imprecise due to limited information 
on the best LUTs of neighboring parcels. First, it is impossible to know best LUTs of 
“outside” parcels, i.e., parcels belonging to other farmers, since farmers make LUT choice 
simultaneously. Second, even for “inside” parcels best LUTs may be unknown at a given step 
of list traversing. There are, in fact, four classes of information availability in which 
neighboring parcels can be classified (table B.1) and only two of them, “inside listed above” 
and “unlisted”, correspond to available information. The other two, “outside” and “inside 
listed below”, are mitigated by assuming that previous LUTs are kept. 
Table B.1 [here] 
The need for a hypothesis on parcels of the class “inside listed below” is gradually eliminated 
by the multiple iterations of the local optimization procedure. 
B.1.3 [P] identification of best LUTs for listed parcels 




′ 𝑒 , 𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1)
= 𝜂𝑘𝜃(𝜏𝑘 , 𝜏𝑘
′ 𝑒) (1 − 𝑝?̂?(𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ 𝑒)) − 𝑐(𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑘,𝑡)      
− 𝑓1{𝜏𝑘 = 𝐻𝑅𝐹𝐵𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 ∈ EE zone}                   (𝐴. 1) 
In equation A.1, τk is the LUT potentially adopted at the k-th parcel and τk’
e
 is the vector of 
LUTs expected to be adopted at the neighboring parcels of k. The term θ(τk, τk’
e
) is the 
deterministic profit. The probability with which the k-th parcel accidentally burns is pk(τk, 
τk’
e), referred to as “risk”. The term 𝑐(𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑘,𝑡) is the land use change cost cost. It is 
defined by table SM.2.9 which contains estimates from concrete data. Land use change cost 
is a function of three variables, current LUT, previous above-ground biomass (AGB) 
accumulated in the parcel and current LUT. The four components of whole-farm profit are 
fractions, belonging to the [0;1] interval. 
The last component accounts for fines due to the development of reckless fire in 
enforcement-effective zones. In command-and-control simulations, farmers committing such 
transgression are fined with a fixed value, f, for each parcel in which transgression takes 
place. The indicator function, 1{}, takes unitary value for reckless fire parcels located in 
enforcement-effective zones. In the baseline experiment, f is set to zero. 
The functions θ(.) and 𝑝?̂?(. ) take the form of probit models and their complete specification 
is found in appendix C. 
The parcel-level expected profit is a fraction. It is not an absolute amount of money but the 
share of the maximum profit level obtainable, i.e., it is a fraction of the profit generation 
potential of a one-hectare parcel. Consequently, actual profit and its accumulation over time, 
i.e., wealth, are also measured in “share of profit potential” units, which is the standard for all 
monetary variables. It is assumed that prices are stable enough over time to not cause relevant 
changes in monetary values measured as just detailed. 
(2) The LUT with the highest parcel-level profit is defined as the “best-LUT”; 
(3) Above-ground biomass (AGB) of parcels and farm-level land use change cost are updated 
based on best-LUTs. 
B.1.4 [P] update of assumptions on current LUTs of neighboring parcels 
After all listed parcels have executed procedures B.1.2 and B.1.5, best-LUTs of listed parcels 
are known. Listed parcels access this information and replace assumptions on inside-listed 
below neighbors by actual best-LUTs. Expected profit is recalculated by listed parcels. 
B.1.5 [F] calculus of whole-farm expected profit 
Whole-farm profit is calculated as the sum of parcel-level profit resulting from B.1.4. For 
this, best-LUTs are considered to be adopted at listed parcels and previous LUTs to be 
adopted at unlisted parcels. Procedures B.1.2 to B.1.5 are repeated while (i) repetitions 
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increase whole-farm expected profit by more than 5% and (ii) the number of repetitions 
remains below ten. 
It must be highlighted that it is only in the first iteration that previous LUTs are assumed to 
be adopted at neighboring parcels of the class “inside listed below”. In subsequent iterations, 
best-LUTs are available and considered, even if defined in previous iterations. 
B.2 [P&F] calculate-profit (as executed in incentive-based simulations) 
In incentive-based simulations, the "calculate-profit" procedure is subdivided into two sub-
procedures. First, “unrestricted-calculate-profit” does not impose compliance to contract 
norms as restrictions to optimization. Second, “restricted-calculate-profit” forces compliance. 
The two sub-procedures differ only in one module, “identification of best LUTs for listed 
parcels” which is the algorithm that incorporates (or not) contract rules. 
In addition, the “calculate-profit” procedure differs from baseline and command-and-control 
simulations with regard to (i) the formula of parcel-level expected profit, (ii) a procedure that 
incorporates received subsidies and contract breaking penalties to whole-farm expected 
profit, (iii) a procedure in which resulting portfolio and whole-farm expected profit are 
stored. In the next two subsections only the altered and additional procedures are detailed. 
The third subsection presents the structure of “calculate-profit” for incentive-based 
instruments. 
B.2.1 [P] Identification of best LUTs for listed parcels, unrestricted 
(1) In incentive-based simulations, the parcel-level expected profit does not contain the 
component that accounts for fines due to violations of command-and-control policy. This is 
consistent with the fact that in policy simulations, only one policy instrument is active. 
Parcel-level expected profit is computed, in incentive-based simulations, as follows. 
𝑟?̃?(𝜂𝑘, 𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ 𝑒 , 𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1)
= 𝜂𝑘𝜃(𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ 𝑒) (1 − 𝑝?̂?(𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ 𝑒))
− 𝑐(𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑘,𝑡)                                           (𝐴. 2) 
It must be clarified that received LUT subsidy and contract breaking are not accounted for in 
parcel-level expected profit and, consequently, do not influence the identification of best 
LUTs. This is consistent with the assumption that contract status is decided by farmers in the 
basis of the whole-farm expected profits yielded by two LUT portfolios, one that is restricted 
to fit contract norms and another which is free to violate such norms. It is into the whole-farm 
expected profits associated with these two portfolios that subsidies and the penalty for 
contract breaking are incorporated (B.2.4 below). 
(2) Same as B.1.3(2), best-LUT is defined as the LUT with highest profit. 
(3) Same as B.1.3(3), update of AGB and land use change cost. 
B.2.2 [P] Identification of best LUTs for listed parcels, restricted 
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(1) Same as B.2.1(1). 
(2) Same as B.1.3(2), best-LUT is defined as the LUT with highest profit. 
(3) Best-LUT is changed depending on its value, on previous LUT and on the active subsidy 
contract, as follows. 
Under Conservation contract 
If previous LUT is forest aged at least 10 years, best-LUT is changed to forest 
In all remaining cases, best-LUT is not changed. 
Under Conservation+ contract 
If best-LUT and previous LUT are reckless fire, best-LUT is changed to controlled 
fire 
If best-LUT is reckless fire and previous LUT is not reckless fire, best-LUT is changed 
to previous LUTIf previous LUT is forest aged at least 10 years, best-LUT is changed 
to forest 
In all remaining cases, best-LUT is not changed. 
Under Mechanization contract 
If previous LUT is an agricultural LUT (reckless fire, controlled fire or fire-free), 
best-LUT is changed to fire-free 
In all remaining cases, best-LUT is not changed. 
(4) Same as B.1.3(3), update of AGB and land use change cost. 
B.2.3 [F] Storage of LUT portfolios and whole-farm profits 
The two LUT portfolios generated, the “unrestricted” and “restricted”, are stored in farmers’ 
memory as well as the associated whole-farm profits. 
B.2.4 [F] Incorporation of received subsidies and penalty 
(1) Total received subsidy, S, is calculated as the product of a fixed payment per hectare, s, 
and the number of parcels with subsidised (target) activity, N. Thus, S = sN; 
(2) The penalty for contract breaking is calculated as accumulated S since the beginning of 
the current contract; 
(3) Whole-farm expected profit yielded by unrestricted portfolio is updated by the deduction 
of the contract breaking penalty (which is zero if contract duration is zero or 5 years); 
(4) Whole-farm expected profit yielded by restricted portfolio is updated by the addition of S. 
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B.2.5 [F] Storage of updated whole-farm profits 
Whole-farm profits from restricted and unrestricted LUT portfolios are, after being updated 
with subsidies and penalty, stored in memory in place of previous values. 
B.2.6 Structure of calculate-profit  
(1) Unrestricted-calculate-profit 
(1.a) [F] Generation of parcel list 
(1.b) [P] Assumptions on best LUTs of neighboring parcels 
(1.c) [P] Identification of best LUTs for listed parcels, unrestricted 
(1.d) [P] Update of assumptions on current LUTs of neighboring parcels 
(1.e) [F] Calculus of whole-farm expected profit 
(1.f) [F] Storage of unrestricted portfolio and associated whole-farm profit 
(2) Restricted-calculate-profit 
(2.a) [F] Generation of parcel list 
(2.b) [P] Assumptions on best LUTs of neighboring parcels 
(2.c) [P] Identification of best LUTs for listed parcels, restricted 
(2.d) [P] Update of assumptions on current LUTs of neighboring parcels 
(2.e) [F] Calculus of whole-farm expected profit 
(2.f) [F] Storage of restricted portfolio and associated whole-farm profit 
(3) [F] Incorporation of received subsidies and penalty 
(4) [F] Storage of updated whole-farm profits 
B.3 [P&F] implement-LUT-portfolio (as executed in baseline and command-and-
control simulations) 
The best-LUTs are adopted at each parcel. Unlisted parcels adopt previous LUTs. 
Afterwards, AGB is updated. 
B.4 [P&F] implement-LUT-portfolio (as executed in incentive-based simulations) 
Farmers choose between unrestricted and restricted LUT portfolios the one with the highest 
whole-farm expected profit. The chosen portfolio is implemented with the best-LUTs it 
specifies being adopted at listed parcels. Unlisted parcels adopt previous LUTs. Afterwards, 
AGB is updated. 
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B.5 [F] subsidy-payment-account (only executed in incentive-based simulations) 
(1) If a restricted LUT portfolio was implemented, total received subsidy, S, is calculated as 
the product of a fixed payment per hectare, s, and the number of parcels with subsidised 
(target) activity, N. Thus, S = sN. The penalty for contract breaking is set to zero; 
(2) If an unrestricted portfolio is implemented, total received subsidy is set to zero. The 
penalty for contract breaking is calculated as accumulated S since the beginning of the 
current contract. 
B.6 [F] LUC-cost-account 
Land use change (LUC) cost is calculated for the whole farm, after LUT portfolio choice. 
B.7 [F] update-contract-duration (only executed in incentive-based simulations) 
(1) Contract status is updated after the decision between restricted and unrestricted LUT 
portfolios by processing the rules that follow, which are also summed up in the flowchart at 
the end of this submodel. 
(1.a) If contract duration is zero and: 
(1.a.i) an unrestricted portfolio was implemented, contract status is set to “do not 
adhere/sign”; 
(1.a.ii) a restricted portfolio was implemented, contract status is set to “adhere/sign”; 
(1.b) If contract duration is above zero and below 5 periods and: 
(1.b.i) a restricted portfolio was implemented, contract status is set to “keep”; 
(1.b.i) an unrestricted portfolio was implemented, contract status is set to “break”; 
(1.c) If contract duration is exactly 5 periods and: 
(1.c.i) a restricted portfolio was implemented, contract status is set to “renewal”; 
(1.c.i) an unrestricted portfolio was implemented, contract status is set to “exit”; 
In sum, whenever restricted portfolio yields a higher profit (being “best”), contract is signed, 
kept or renewed. Contrariwise, contract is not signed, broken or not renewed (figure B.1 
below). 
(2) Update of contract duration and accumulated total received subsidies (payments), acc.S, is 
pursued by applying the following rules: 
(2.a) If contract status is “adhere/sign”, contract duration is set to one period and acc.St = St 
where St is the current value of total received subsidies; 
(2.b) If contract status is “keep”, contract duration is increased by one period and acc.St = 
acc.St-1 + St; 
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(2.c) If contract status is “break”, the contract duration and acc.St are both set to zero; 
(2.d) If contract status is “renewal”, contract duration is set to one period and acc.St = St 
(2.d) If contract status is “exit”, contract duration and acc.St are both set to zero. 
Figure B.1 Contract status assignment flowchart 
 
 
B.8 [N] define-burned-parcels 
Procedure 
Nature defines the parcels that accidentally burn on the basis of the components of a parcel-
level latent flammability index. Parcels with accidental burns generate null actual profit. 
The latent flammability model 
The occurrence of an accidental fire in the k-th parcel is assumed to follow a latent variable 
probit model (Wooldridge, 2002, section 15.3). Ik* is the latent (unobservable) flammability 
index such that yk = 1{Ik* > 0} and Ik* = E[Ik*|Xk] + uk ~ Xkβ + uk, where 1{} is the indicator 
function and Xk is a vector of observables. Predictors of Ik* that are non-observable to 
farmers are captured by uk, a standard Gaussian disturbance. Consequently, 𝑝𝑘(𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ 𝑒) ≡ 
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P(yk=1|Xk) = G(Xkβ) with G(.) being the standard Gaussian cdf. Whenever Ik* = Xkβ + uk > 
0, and, thus, yk = 1, an accidental fire occurs at the k-th parcel.  
The matrix Xk contains independent variables which capture LUTs conducted in the parcel 
and in its queen neighbourhood (complete specification in appendix C). Above-ground 
biomass (AGB, tons of biomass / hectare) is taken as a proxy for the ability of a forested 
pixel to contain fire spreads (see, for instance, Brando et al, 2013). 
The unobservables synthesized by uk can be thought of as physical and climate time-varying 
conditions such as wind velocity and stochastic (unpredictable) components of local 
precipitation and temperature. 
B.9 [G] sanction-rulebreakers (only executed in command-and-control simulations) 
In command-and-control simulations, farmers conducting reckless fire in parcels belonging to 
enforcement-effective zones are fined with a fixed value, f, for each parcel in which 
transgression takes place. 
B.10 [F] calculate-actual-profit (as executed in baseline and command-and-control 
simulations) 
(1) Whole farm profit after accidental burns is calculated as follows: 
𝑟(𝜂𝑘, 𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ , 𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1)
= ∑ 𝜂𝑘𝜃(𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ )(1 − 𝑦𝑘)
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
− ∑ 𝑐(𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑘,𝑡)
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
   
− ∑ 𝑓1{𝜏𝑘 = 𝐻𝑅𝐹𝐵𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 ∈ EE zone}
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
                                            (𝐴. 3)  
With the occurrence of an accidental fire at the k-th parcel being indicated with value 1 for 
the binary yk (and non-occurrence with 0). 
(2) Wealth is updated by adding to the current actual profit to its previous value; 
B.11 [F] calculate-actual-profit (as executed in incentive-based simulations) 
(1) Whole farm profit after accidental burns is calculated as follows: 
𝑟(𝜂𝑘, 𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ , 𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1)
= ∑ 𝜂𝑘𝜃(𝜏𝑘, 𝜏𝑘
′ )(1 − 𝑦𝑘)
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
− ∑ 𝑐(𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑘,𝑡)
𝐾𝑖
𝑘=1
   
+ 1{𝑖 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠} (1{𝑖 𝑘𝑒𝑝𝑡}𝑠𝑁 − 1{𝑖 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒 } ∑ 𝑠𝑁𝜏
𝑡−1
𝜏=𝜏0
)                              (𝐴. 4)  
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Where “i holds” indicates that the i-th farmer holds a contract in current period and “i kept” 
and “i broke” indicate, respectively, whether the contract is kept or broken. The number of 
pixels with target activity is N, τ0 is the year the contract started and “t” is the current period. 
(2) Wealth is updated by adding the current actual profit to its previous value; 
B.13 [F] update-risk-parameters 
Procedure 
(1) After LUT portfolios are implemented and accidental burns occur, the current statuses of 
parcels regarding these two characteristics are incorporated into farmers’ databases. This is 
done respecting the restriction that farmers observe only the statuses of own parcels and 
parcels within 100m of the boundaries of the farmer’s own farm; 
(2) The expanded database is used to re-estimate risk parameters. Estimation is pursued by 
calling the statistical software R
6
 with Rserve extension for NetLogo (Thiele and Grimm, 
2011). Farmers then employ the generalized linear model (GLM) routine to estimate a probit 
model based on available data; 
(3) Estimations may be inconclusive for parameters which capture the effect of LUTs not 
developed on the farm or within 100m of it in the current and previous years. In this case, 
farmers do not update the parameters’ values; 
(4) The set of new point estimates generated is stored in memory to be used in the next period 
for estimating probabilities of parcels being accidentally burned. 
Further details 
Farmers are ignorant of the two drivers of accidental fires, β and uk, but try to estimate the 
former with data on Xk and yk collected from observations made within a radius of sight that 
comprises own-farm-parcels and parcels within 100m of farm boundaries. I.e., agents see one 
pixel beyond farm boundaries. Risk parameters are re-estimated at each step from pooled 
cross section data covering all previous periods.  
B.14 [P] store-LUT-portfolio-in-memory 
Current LUTs, forest age and AGBs are stored in memory, in order to be used by calculations 
that require information about the previous period (e.g., LUC cost calculation). 
B.15 [P] update-forest-age-after-burn 
A 100% loss of above-ground biomass at forested parcels that accidentally burn is assumed. 
This procedure defines, for such parcels, forest age to be zero. 
B.16 Flows of procedures by simulation category 
Table B.2 [here] 










Appendix C Deterministic profit and risk functions 
C.1 Deterministic profit 
The functional form of the deterministic component of parcel-level expected profit is as 
follows. 
 
Where G(.) is the standard Gaussian cdf, d_τ_0, d_τ_1 and d_τ_2 are binaries indicating, 
respectively, whether reckless fire (τ = 0) or controlled fire (τ = 1) or fire-free (τ = 2), are 
developed in the k-th parcel. N_ τ_0, N_ τ_1 and N_ τ_2 are the counts of parcels with the 
LUTs just mentioned at the queen-neighborhood. The above-ground biomass of forest 
accumulated in the parcel is denoted by AGB and measured in tons of biomass/hectare. It is 
assumed that both own-parcel AGB and the average AGB of neighbouring parcels, w_AGB, 
are determinants of the profit from forest. AGB grows with forest age according to the 
logistic function estimated by Neeff and Santos (2005; tables 1, 2 and 3, figure 6) on the basis 
of data from secondary forests of Tapajós region, Central Amazon. Parcels allocated to non-
forest LUTs always have zero AGB. 
From equation (2) it is possible to obtain the deterministic profit of the j-th LUT, as follows. 
 
C.2 Deterministic profit parameters 
The assignment of the parameters of the deterministic profit follows the principles P1-P5 
below, which further detail on how the agglomerative and dispersive forces behind profit 
work. 
(P1) Forest products principle. Forest provides direct benefits with timber and non-timber 
forest products. The aggregated quantity of products supplied increase with forest age; 
(P2) Ecosystem services principle. Forest increases water availability and soil quality, 
yielding benefits which cross parcel boundaries (table 3 in the main text). The magnitudes of 
the benefits brought by such positive externalities are positively correlated with accumulated 
AGB. For the sake of simplicity and lack of precise information about the environmental 
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service effect of forest on agricultural land uses, it is assumed that the three agricultural land 
uses have their profit increased by the same magnitude for each increment of the average 
AGB of surrounding parcels. 
(P3) Forest fragmentation principle. An “island” of forest provides less ecosystem services 
(water and soil quality) and products than a “sea” of forest, as studies of forest fragmentation 
show (Laurance et al, 2006, Ferraz et al, 2003, Stouffer and Bierregaard, 2006). This 
principle is roughly captured by the average AGB of neighboring parcels, since deforested 
neighboring parcels are counted in the denominator of the average even holding with zero 
amount of AGB. 
(P4) Agglomeration principle. The profit of a LUT increases with the number of neighboring 
parcels with the same LUT (see table 3). The list of LUTs in descending order by 
agglomeration externalities is (1) fire-free (capital-intensive), (2) controlled fire (incorporates 
fixed cost of fire control), (3) reckless fire, (4) Forest. 
(P5) There are particular neighboring LUT mosaics (configurations) for which the conversion 
of forest to non-forest LUTs pays off. 
The five principles can be quantified in several alternative manners in order to generate the 
values of the parameters. In this paper, the conventions adopted are presented in table C.1. 
Table C.1 [here] 
The conventions generate an exactly determined linear system of 10 equations and 10 
unknowns in the form xα = G-1(Θ), with x being the covariates of the deterministic profit 
function, G
-1
(.) being the inverse Gaussian cdf and Θ the vector with profit levels (second 
column of table above). 
C.3 Risk functional form 
The probability of a parcel to accidentally burn, as estimated by agents, takes the functional 
form below. 
 
C.4 Risk parameters 
True parameters of the risk function are fixed in values according with five principles. 
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(P1) Minimum risk principle. A parcel faces the lowest level of probability
7
 of being 
accidentally burned when covered with 10 year old forest and surrounded by queen-
neighboring parcels which, in average, are covered by 10 year old forest; 
(P2) Fire accumulation principle: the larger the number of fire sources in the proximity of the 
parcels, including the parcel itself, the larger the probability of the parcel to be accidentally 
burned; 
(P3) Fire control principle: controlled fires are less prone to escape than reckless fires; 
(P4) Distance principle: the closer to the parcel a fire source is, the higher is the probability 
with which the parcel accidentally burns. Therefore, the two fire-based LUTs, reckless fire 
and controlled fire, impose a lower probability of accidental burn when conducted in the 
neighborhood than in the own parcel; 
(P5) Fire protection principle: forest exerts a negative influence on the probability of 
accidental fires, a positive externality. The higher the average AGB accumulated in 
neighboring parcels, the lower the risk of the parcel to be accidentally burned. The 
“protective” effect of forest increases with accumulated AGB; 
(P6) fire-free principle: the presence of fire-free in the parcel and in the neighborhood 
increases sensibly the probability of accidental fires. Even though not representing an ignition 
source, such technology, as any land management technology, is established through the 
removal of forest cover and this leads to the accumulation of flammable debris and local 
dryness. 
To quantify the principles above, the conventions in table C.2 are adopted. 
Table C.2 [here] 
  
                                                          
7
 The description of how deforestation increases fire-proneness of Amazon forest, by Brando et al (2014), makes 
clear how forest fragmentation affects the probability of fires. “First, by reducing canopy cover and 
evapotranspiration, deforestation increases average dry-season land-surface temperatures (…), which in turn 
promotes air movement between open fields and neighboring forests. Consequently, fuels along forest edges are 
expected to become drier, leading to increased fire intensity (…). Second, deforestation fragments the 
landscape, creating a greater perimeter of forest edges (…). Third, tree mortality associated with previous 
logging, fire, severe drought, or edge effects can contribute to coarse fuel loads for multiple years as the twigs 
and branches of standing dead trees gradually decay and fall to the ground.” 
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Table 1 Main uncertainties regarding Amazon fires  
Question Answer 
Which is the share of remote-sensing fire detections related 
with: 
(1) Agricultural fires 
(1.a) Deforestation; 
(1.b) Fallow-based agriculture; 
(1.c) Pasture management and restoration; 
(2) Accidental fires. 
Unknown, available remote-sensing 
data comprehends (i) point detections 
or "hotpixels" and (ii) "burned areas". 
With such information it is only 
possible to know the approximate 
location of fires and path followed, but 
not the finalities with which fires were 
started.  
With which probability does an agricultural fire run out of 
control, turning into an accidental fire, and how does this 
depend on surrounding land use and fire control practices? Unknown 
Which are the economic returns of the following 
alternatives to fire: 
(1) Mechanized land preparation, conducted in small plots 
(3 hectares at most); 
(2) Green land preparation (with fast-growing-N-fixing 
species and/or mulching); 
(3) Agroforestry (integrated crop and forestry). 
A few field-based studies have 
produced cost and revenue data, but the 
information remains anecdotal. 
Which is the rate of illegal fire users identified and 
sanctioned? 
Reports of these events are dissipated 
across the three levels of government. 
No comprehensive assessment is 
available. The number of undetected 
occurrences seems to be high for most 
Brazilian Amazon states due to lack of 
monitoring and the difficulty of 
identifying fire starters. 
Which is the rate of sanctioned farmers among the ones that 
have accidentally burned neighbors' land? 
Which is the rate of identified and sanctioned farmers 
among the ones that have caused wildfires? 






Table 2 Incentive-based instruments  
Feature/ contract Conservation Conservation +  Mechanization 
Target activity 
Conservation of 
forests aged at least 
10 years 
Conservation of 
forests aged at least 
10 years 
Conversion of fire-
based to fire-free 
agriculture and 
keeping the latter 
Target social group All farmers All farmers 
Only smallholders 
(farm area <= 200 
ha) 
Forbidden LUT None reckless fire None 
Forbidden land use 
change 
Conversion of forests 
aged at least 10 years 
Conversion of forests 





















 as detailed by Sánchez-Azoeifa et al. (2007); 
b
 in accordance with Barlow et al (2012); 
c
 see Simões and 




Table 3 Forces that drive agglomeration and dispersion of LUTs 







on reckless fires 
(reckless fire) 
Labor economies on 
burnings
a
 [θ]  Accidental fire risk [p] 
 Ecosystem services 
provided by forest to 
agriculture  [θ] 
 Accidental fire risk 
mitigation service 
provided by forest [p] 
Agriculture based 
on controlled fires 
(controlled fire) 
Scale economies on fire 
control practices (eg, 
firebreaks)
b
  [θ] 
Fire-free agriculture  
Scale economies on 
machinery and input use  
[θ] 
Forest 
.Edge effects [θ] 
.Accidental fire risk 
mitigation service provided 
by forest [p] 
None 
“P” denotes forces which affect the profit of LUTs and “R” the forces which affect probability of accidental 
burns (risk). 
a see Righi et al (2009) and Sorrensen (2000, 2004)  











C&C Con.+ Con. Mech. C&C Con.+ Con. Mech. 
0 69% 69% 69% 69% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
0.1 53% 0% 47% 0% 19% 0% 40% 52% 
0.2 48% 0% 26% 0% 17% 0% 30% 51% 
0.3 48% 9% 38% 0% 17% 0% 32% 52% 
0.4-1 48% 0% 38% 0% 17% 0% 32% 52% 





Table 6 Difference of conservation and conservation+ contracts on counts of 







Contracts Area Contracts Area Contracts Area 
0.1 1 -15 1 385 2 370 
0.2 3 133 0 -93 3 40 
0.3 1 11 0 -192 1 -181 





Table 7 Ranks for long run causal effects of instruments on fires (avoided fires) 














0.1 Con. Con. 
0.1 Mech. Con+ 
0.1 Con+ C&C 
0.1 C&C Mech. 
0.2 Con. Con. 
0.2 Con+ Con+ 
0.2 Mech. C&C 
0.2 C&C Mech. 
0.3-1 Con. Con+ 
0.3-1 Con+ Con. 
0.3-1 Mech. C&C 
0.3-1 C&C Mech. 
a The intensity level is the magnitude of the fine and subsidy in the simulations; 
b 
All fires are considered, i.e., accidental fires, reckless fire and controlled fire, without double-counting;
 
c 










Reason for unavailability 

















Listed below current parcel 
(Needed only in the first 







Not needed: unlisted 






Table B.2 Flow of procedures, baseline and command-and-control simulations 
Order Procedure 
0 [N&F&P] Initialization 
1 [P&F] calculate-profit 
2 [P&F] implement-LUT-portfolio 
3 [F] LUC-cost-account 
4 [N] define-burned-parcels 
5 [G] sanction-rulebreakers 
6 [F] calculate-actual-profit 
7 [F] update-risk-parameters 
8 [P] store-LUT-portfolio-in-memory 





Table B.3 Flow of procedures, incentive-based simulations 
Order Procedure 
0 [N&F&P] Initialization 
1 [P&F] calculate-profit 
2 [P&F] implement-LUT-portfolio 
3 [F] subsidy-payment-account 
4 [F] LUC-cost-account 
5 [F] update-contract-duration 
6 [N] define-burned-parcels 
7 [F] calculate-actual-profit 
8 [F] update-risk-parameters 
9 [P] store-LUT-portfolio-in-memory 











Parcel-own LUT Neighboring LUTs 
PC 1 10.00 Any Freshly abandoned Any configuration 
PC 2 20.00 Any 18 year forest Freshly abandoned 
PC 3 30.00 Any 18 year forest 18 year forest, only 
PC 4 280.01 Forest reckless fire 8 x 25yr forest 
PC 5 562.48 Forest reckless fire 3 x reckless fire + 2 x 75yr forest 
PC 6 280.04 Forest controlled fire 1 x controlled fire + 7 x 30yr forest 
PC 7 561.06 Forest controlled fire 3 x controlled fire + 2 x 80yr forest 
PC 8 440.01 Forest fire-free 2 x fire-free + 6 x 35yr forest 




fire-free 4 x fire-free + 4 x 100yr forest 
PC 10 180.00 
Controlled/ 
reckless fire 
fire-free 8 x 35yr forest 
Note: conventions PC4-PC10 define neighboring LUT configuration in which the shift from the previous to the 
so-called parcel LUT is feasible (P5). This means the following condition is satisfied: 𝜂0𝜃(𝜏𝑘,𝑡 , 𝜏𝑘,𝑡
′ ) (1 −
𝑝𝑘(𝜏𝑘,𝑡 , 𝜏𝑘,𝑡
′ )) − 𝑐(𝜏𝑘,𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑘,𝑡) = 0; with η0 = 0.5 (median landscape value), τk,t being the parcel-own in the 











Table C.2 Conventions for assigning risk parameters 
Convention Risk level Parcel-own LUT Neighboring LUT 
RC 1 0.0001 Ten year forest Ten year forest, only 
RC 2 0.0002 Five year forest Ten year forest, only 
RC 3 0.0003 Five year forest Forest with zero years, all 8 neighbors 
RC 4 0.0004 Ten year forest 7/8 10 year forest & 1/8 fire-free agriculture 
RC 5 0.0005 Fire-free agriculture Ten year forest, only 
RC 6 0.0006 Ten year forest 7/8 10 year forest & 1/8 controlled fire 
RC 7 0.0007 Controlled fire Ten year forest, only 
RC 8 0.0008 Ten year forest 7/8 10 year forest & 1/8 reckless fire 
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